讀《中國和塔利班（英文）》有感
莊冬
我把ywa13網友轉的《中國和塔利班（英文）》附在最後供大家參考
我讀了《中國和塔利班（英文）》以為這篇文章揭示了一個特別重要的戰爭和實現戰爭成果的問題。
記得小時候看關於抗日戰爭的小說就注意到日軍特別需要中國人幫忙（主要是兩種）：一種是偽軍和漢殲翻譯官什麽的就不用說了；另一種是就連一些當時是屬於比較現代化的東西，比如說鐵路、電話和發電廠也得中國人來管理，雖然有日軍監視。
所謂現代化的社會和比較現代化的國家的人們的生活是需要各種各樣的工業設施的有條不紊的運行來實現的，所以戰爭過後要實現戰爭的成果已經不像當年西方人到非洲、美洲和亞洲那樣隻要軍隊到了帶上足夠的軍火就可以實現戰爭的成果了，因為那時別的東西都基本上可以就地取材來解決。
現代化的社會不僅人們的生活是需要各種各樣的工業設施的有條不紊的運行來實現的，就連現代化的占領軍（比如說美軍）在一個不太現代化的國家（比如說阿富汗）運作都需要當地有一定的工業設施的有條不紊的運行（比如說這篇文章裏提到的電話和電力）。
一個現代化的占領軍（比如說美軍）在一個不太現代化的國家（比如說阿富汗）完全是為了占領軍自己的軍事需要就麵臨著建立或者至少也要維持當地的一定的基本的工業設施的有條不紊的運行，因為美軍自己不可能帶著個發電廠自己長期或永遠都自己為自己提供自己需要的所有電力。說了基本的能源電力，還要有汽油，恐怕美軍自己也許自己長期或永遠都自己從阿富汗外為自己運送自己需要的所有汽油。即便是被占領國有石油，比如說伊拉克，也還是需要煉油廠的正常運行。這些都需要占領軍或者偽軍來維持。
即便隻是說軍事，占領軍也有跟當地人通訊的問題，因此需要通訊設施的正常運行。當然啦，僅僅是軍事還不能實現戰爭的成果，要實現實現戰爭的成果就必須有當地人的合作。美國人借以得到當地人的合作的方法就是改善當地人的生活，也就是把當地人的生活給搞的現代化一些。這又需要當地有一定的工業設施的有條不紊的運行！
建立或者至少也要維持一個不太現代化的國家（比如說阿富汗，甚至伊拉克）有一定的工業設施的有條不紊的運行也不是美軍甚至美國可以解決的問題，這倒不是因為美國人沒有解決這些問題的技術，而是因為美國人自己來做這些事美國人和當地人都支付不起，因此現代化的美軍占領了一個不太現代化的國家就必須有其它的國家的人們到這個國家來以比較便宜的價格去做這些事。
當然啦，美國人的盟友們的日子過的都不錯，雖然他們的價格也許會比美國人便宜那麽一點點也還是不太好用或者根本用不起的。這樣一來，美軍就需要有一定的技術力量又價格不是太高的人們來幫助美軍實現戰爭的成果。
《中國和塔利班（英文）》這篇文章裏提到的是阿富汗，而且在美軍入侵之前中國就在那裏跟當地人有某些電力和電話方麵的合作了。我猜自從美軍入侵到現在，阿富汗的各種工業設施的建立和正常運行需要中國人幫忙的時候隻會越來越多。也就是說，美國為了在阿富汗的實現戰爭的成果而需要中國人幫忙的時候隻會越來越多。特別是我好象記得美國人還違反美國法律買了中國製造的子彈哪！
網友回複：這篇文章顯示911前中國勢力已經進入阿富汗，美國開打衝中國來。
如果中國勢力成功進入阿富汗，中國即可打通到伊朗的石油通道。不但衝破美國圍堵，還對印度形成鉗形包圍，中國西部威脅基本解除。連帶疆獨勢力一並剪除。這個絕對不是美國可以接受的。美國打阿富汗可能還有許多理由，但這個針對中國的動作不可忽略。
如今阿富汗通道已被美軍絞斷，美軍付出的代價就是不停出血。中國在這種情況下，切不可真心實意幫美軍在阿富汗站穩。一切應以明幫暗怠為原則。通過走私等方法協助塔利班繼續為美軍放血。隻有在阿富汗拖住美軍，中國東線才可以安穩。既然美軍要在南海軍演，就讓中國到阿富汗的軍火走私來得更猛烈些吧，反正我們要把軍力東調，以保朝鮮半島安全，不是嗎？
我答：簡單說中國是民事滲透而美國是軍事占領
誰能長期在阿富汗待下去笑到最後呢？拭目以待吧
好玩的是這篇文章顯示中國跟塔利班拉上關係是從塔利班支持疆獨開始由巴基斯坦介紹的，正可謂“不打不相識”啊！
我永遠相信得人心者得天下。
由於中國是民事滲透而美國是軍事占領，這也就在阿富汗人眼裏有了事實上的美國的軍事占領跟中國的民事滲透的比較。
阿富汗人看到的這兩個外來戶的所作所為以後就必然會有一個比較和人心所向的，因此美國的軍事占領很可能會到頭來進一步幫助了中國的民事滲透，特別是中國的民事滲透是阿富汗人和美軍都需要的。
有意思吧？
附：《中國和塔利班（英文）》
China's Taliban Connection
By Harvinder Sahota
In the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhu Bangzao expended the better part of a week deflecting attention from his country’s extensive dealings with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Zhu Bangzao described as "absurd" any suggestions that China had been involved in any manner with the Taliban [1]. For a state that habitually complains of being a victim to terrorism and “splittists” in Xinjiang, the People’s Republic of China courted the terrorists quite actively.
Ever pragmatic, the People’s Republic of China sought to nip the Uighur separatist movement in the bud by engaging its sponsors in Afghanistan. With the escalation of separatist violence across Xinjinag in 1998, China pressurized its Pakistani clients to rein in Islamic terrorists based in Afghanistan. Consequently, Pakistan facilitated contact between the two sides. Five senior Chinese diplomats arrived in Kabul for talks with the ruling Taliban in February 1999, the first of a series of interactions. Chinese diplomats met with Council of Ministers Deputy Chairman Mullah Muhammad Hassan, Interior Minister Mullah Abdur Razzaq and Deputy Foreign Minister Abdurrahman Zayef, Chinese food aid to the Taliban at the start of winter laid the groundwork for the visit. Following their first meeting, the Chinese announced they had agreed to start direct flights between Kabul and Urumqi, the capital of the troubled Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, and open formal trade ties with the Taliban [2]. The Chinese also agreed to help provide the Taliban with arms and spares for its ageing equipment. Apparently, the two sides agreed to institutionalize military to military contacts [3]. In return the Taliban made it clear that they would not allow Afghan territory to be used against China [4]. The Taliban also facilitated the transfer of at least two unexploded US Tomahawks to China for $20 million each [5].
For the Taliban, its Chinese connection soon proved a commercial and strategic windfall. By 2001 China had become the biggest investor in Afghanistan, with ‘legitimate’ investments running to several tens of millions of dollars [6]. On the strategic front, the Chinese agreed to consider the Taliban’s position when UN sanctions against Afghanistan came up for discussion. In July 2001, Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan met with a Taliban delegation whilst visiting Pakistan. A Chinese delegation headed by Lu Shulin, China’s ambassador to Pakistan, met with Mullah Muhammad Omar in this regard on December 12, 2000; becoming the first non-Muslims to meet with him. The Chinese trip came in response to a Taliban plea to Beijing to veto US-Russian moves to tighten United Nations sanctions against the Afghan Government. The fresh sanctions under discussion at the Security Council included travel restrictions against Taliban officials [7]. Earlier, in November 2000, a delegation from the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, an influential think-tank run by the Ministry of State Security, visited Kabul and Kandahar [8].
In 2000, China's Huawei Technologies Co., the company that Washington has accused of helping Iraq to upgrade its military communications system despite Chinese denials, has other controversial interests in the region. It signed an agreement with the Taliban to install 12,000 fixed-line telephones in Kandahar. Meanwhile, another southern Chinese telecom firm, ZTE, had agreed to install 5,000 telephone lines in Kabul. The deal stalled until Pakistan could provide guarantees for the project [9].
Afghanistan's power grid, severely damaged by years of war, became the destination for the bulk of China’s investment. Repair and expansion work on the Kajaki Dam in Helmand Province began in early 2001. The Chinese Dongfeng Agricultural Machinery Company was hired to add 16.5 MW to its generating [10]. Work was still in progress when the site was bombed in November this year [11]. Transmission lines from the Kajaki Dam to Kandahar were repaired in early 2001, along with a substation in the city, restoring supplies of electricity. The Dahla Dam in Kandahar province also has been restored to operation, along with the Breshna-Kot Dam in Nangarhar province, which has a generating capacity of 11.5 MW. The 66 MW Mahipar hydroelectric plant also is now operational [12]. The Chinese were also involved in refurbishing the Herat Cement Plant [13].
In July 2001 a Taliban delegation led by their Commercial Attaché to Pakistan, spent a week in China as guests of the government. Whilst the Chinese Commerce Ministry declined to accord them the requisite diplomatic protocol, it did facilitate their interaction with a group of Chinese industrialists and businessmen in order to explore business and investment opportunities [14]. The Chinese were dealing with the Taliban right up to the day of the WTC attacks. Indeed a new protocol on commercial relations was inked on the day of the attack [15]. The warmth of the China-Taliban relations can be gauged by annual felicitations conveyed by Mullah Omar (via Radio Shariat) on the occasion of China’s National Day since 1999, and by Osama bin Laden public proclamations of the need to cultivate ties as recently as August 2001 [16].
Notes
[1] ‘China Refutes US Reports on China-Taliban Ties’ Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United Kingdom of the Great Britain and Northern Ireland September 16, 2001 http://www.chinese-embassy.org.uk
[2] Ahmed Rashid ‘Taliban temptation’, Far Eastern Economic Review March 11, 1999.
[3] Tara Shankar Sahay ‘Taliban-China deal puzzles diplomats’ Rediff February 12, 1999.
[4] ‘Bin Ladin Calls for Taliban-China Good Relations to Reduce US Influence’ Ausaf (in Urdu) August 14, 2001. via FBIS
[5] China paid Laden for access to Cruise missiles AFP March 9, 2001.
[6] John Pomfret ‘China Strengthens Ties With Taleban by Signing Economic Deal’ Washington Post September 13, 2001.
[7] Munawar Hasan 'Taliban team to visit China to boost The Nation July 4, 2001. See also David Murphy and Susan V. Lawrence ‘Beijing Hopes to gain from US raids’ Far Eastern Economic Review October 4, 2001 and Dan Birstow 'China flirts with an independent pro-active Afghan policy' Central Asia Analyst January 3, 2001.
[8] Pomfret, ibid.
[9]‘China Firm Trades with Taliban’ Far Eastern Economic Review March 15, 2001.
[10] See ‘Afghanistan’ Energy Information Administration U.S. Department of Energy 2001.
[11] ‘US strikes targets around Kandahar’ AFP November 7, 2001.
[12] DOE, ibid,
[13] Pomfret, ibid.
[14] Munawar Hasan, ibid.
[15] Pomfret, ibid.
[16] Ausaf op. cit. and various broadcasts of Radio Shariat.
