財經觀察 1331 --- 後泡沫世界的陷阱

史蒂芬·羅奇："後泡沫世界"的陷阱

作者史蒂芬•羅奇（ Stephen S. Roach ）為摩根士丹利 前首席經濟學家 , 現任亞洲主席
[10-01 08:48] 　

http://www.caijing.com.cn/2008-10-01/110017177.html

世界能否從這次宏觀震蕩中汲取深刻的教訓？美國和中國可能是其中的關鍵，而近期的跡象並不樂觀

【《財經網》專稿 / 特約作者 史蒂芬·羅奇】這是一種似曾相識的邏輯。

　　一年前，幾乎沒有任何端倪暗示世界金融市場及全球經濟將要發生什麽。當然，美國住房抵押貸款市場中的次貸板塊全盤表現不佳已有征兆，但是，正如 2000 年早期的網絡公司泡沫一般，人們普遍認為次貸對宏觀麵的影響甚微。否認 —— 這種人類最強有力的情感之一，再一次占了上風。消費者、商人、決策者以及政客，全都忽略了次貸當中正在醞釀的問題，並一致相信此前五年的全球經濟繁榮趨勢依然完好無損。
　　一年前的爭論被蒙上了一種令人心痛的似曾相識感。早在 1999 年底，網絡公司僅占美國股票市場市值的 6% 。強大、靈活、富於創新的美國經濟被寄予厚望，人們相信它會為股票市場另外的 94% 以及宏觀經濟提供內在彈性及持續支持；而一年前，次貸僅占已發行證券化抵押貸款總額的 14% ，依然強大、靈活、創新的美國經濟被再次寄予厚望，人們仍相信它會為另外 86% 的抵押貸款市場及宏觀經濟提供持續支持。
　　 2000 年如此，一年前又是如此。這種邏輯是何等的謬誤啊！
　　八年半以前，網絡公司泡沫破裂。緊隨其後的是美國廣義標準普爾 500 指數在接下來的兩年半內劇跌 49% 。一年前，次貸泡沫的破裂，觸發了信貸及資本市場上危機的空前蔓延，使得那些曾經何等驕傲的美國金融界的 " 大眾偶像 " 們紛紛倒下 —— 起初是貝爾斯登，現在是雷曼兄弟與美林。教訓令人痛心地相似。當整個資產類別（或就此而論，一個經濟體）走向極端，整個資產鏈中最微弱的環節常常會給整個係統帶來決定性的打擊。以泡沫類比恰是如此。當泡沫表膜最薄的部分出現問題，其中的空氣便迅速逃逸。
　　但是，這種比喻漏掉了關鍵一點。泡沫的膨脹是一個在不知不覺中加劇的過程。從股票到房產再到信貸，泡沫在規模和風險程度上不斷擴大，充滿泡沫的美國經濟醞釀著一場係統性風險的狂風暴雨，並對美國以及日益相互依存的世界經濟帶來影響。而今，隻留下我們收拾殘局。

（一）危機根源

　 　創紀錄的美國消費狂潮事問題的根源所在 —— 觸發源便是，從以收入為基礎的儲蓄模式到以資產為基礎的儲蓄模式的貿然轉型

　　沒有一個經濟體可以永久地入不敷出。但正如那些曾經如此嚐試的國家一樣，美國自認為這次可以與眾不同。美國的經常賬戶赤字從 1995 年占 GDP 的 1.5% 猛然升至 2006 年的 6% 。 2006 年第三季度，赤字按年計算的規模達到 8440 億美元的頂峰，美國每個交易日要從海外引入 34 億美元的資本，方能補足國內儲蓄的巨大差額。

　　長久以來，這些資金支持隨喚隨到。大批新的理論被捏造出來，用以理性地解釋，為什麽無法持續的東西實際上也可能持續下去。很多人辯稱，對於擁有世界儲備幣種的國度而言，無拘無束的海外借貸是一種特權。有些人甚至走得更遠，開始慶祝新的第二代 " 布雷頓森林體係 " 的降臨。他們認為，像中國一樣擁有額外儲蓄的國家會源源不斷地將過剩的美元換成美國資產，以此保持本國貨幣的競爭力，以及出口導向型的增長模式。當然，到頭來，關於這些 " 新範式 " 的解說也如以往一樣，未能經受住時間及市場的考驗。

　　問題的根源，是美國從以收入為基礎的儲蓄模式向以資產為基礎的儲蓄的貿然轉型。美國消費者率先行動。在 1994 年到 2007 年的 14 年間，美國實際消費需求的趨勢增長率按實值計算，每年高達 3.5% 。其持續時間如此之長，對現代曆史上的任何一個經濟體而言，都可謂一場最為盛大的消費狂歡。不用介意那看似正在緩慢衰竭的收入增長，雖然在這一時期，實際的個人可支配收入的平均增長率僅為 3.2% 。美國消費者感到他們不必再以傳統的方式存款了。自大蕭條以來，他們首次將收入型儲蓄的利率逼為零。為什麽不呢？畢竟，他們已經發現了一種新的以資產為基礎的儲蓄策略 —— 先是 20 世紀 90 年代後半期，拿股票質押；而後是本世紀的前五年，拿房產質押。寬鬆的規章條例及監督管理，加之過度的貨幣政策調整，導致這種廉價而隨意的信貸最終崩潰，證明其不過是一層脆弱的糖衣而已。

　　回顧過去，與美國住房的價值空間相比，股票的財富效應就相形見絀了。在 2006 年中期的巔峰之時，出自住宅房產的淨房產抵押提取現金量（ net equityextraction ）飛漲至可支配個人收入的 9% ，是五年前此項讀數 3% 的三倍整。這就使得收入短缺的美國消費者不僅可以揮霍以收入為基礎的儲蓄，還把 2007 年的消費推高至當年 GDP 的 72% ，創下曆史紀錄。在這一結果的背後，是兩個巨大泡沫 —— 房產和信貸的共同作用。它們把住宅變成自動取款機（ ATM ）。最終，美國消費者心安理得地透支了他們的住宅財產這一未來儲蓄的主要來源，來為今天的消費買單。當然，他們最終也不可避免地背上了創紀錄的債務負擔。截至 2007 年底，家庭部門的負債率飛漲至可支配個人收入的 133% ，較之於區區十年前還是 90% 的主流債務負擔率，竟也上升了 40 多個百分點，簡直荒謬至極。而其持續的時間越長，它在美國人心目中就越根深蒂固。現在，終於結束了。

（二）亞洲的關聯

　　隨著美國消費陷入困境，亞洲出口導向型的增長機製目前也處境危險

　　雖然看似 " 美國製造 " ，但這個過剩時代的規模也確實席卷了全球。美國的消費狂潮，正是世界其他出口導向型經濟體的給養，對發展中的亞洲而言尤其如此。自世紀之交以來，亞洲成為世界上增長最快的主要地區。其規模之大，足以占據世界總產出（按購買力平價測算）的 20% 。 2000 年至 2007 年間，亞洲新興經濟體的實際 GDP 平均增長 8% ，是同一時期世界其他地區 3% 的增速的 2.5 倍。為了尋求快速增長，以達到發展及減貧的目標，亞洲新興經濟體將美國的消費狂潮視為 " 來自天堂的甘露 " ；消費不足的日本也做出了類似的回應；韓國與台灣這兩個亞洲地區較大的新興工業化經濟體亦是如此。

　　一點也沒錯，正是這種 " 高能燃料 " 推動了亞洲的繁榮增長 —— 那是一種日益強大的出口導向型增長機製。對於整個發展中的亞洲而言， 2007 年的出口創下紀錄，占當年該地區總 GDP 的 45% ，比 20 世紀 90 年代中期時的主流比例高出十幾個百分點。這就令亞洲這個世界上增長最快的地區比以往更依賴於外部需求。而隨著上述外部需求的最大來源 —— 美國消費最終陷入困境，亞洲出口導向型的增長機製目前也處境危險。

　　在此，中國的角色無疑很關鍵。經過 2006 年到 2007 年這兩年間 GDP 近乎 12% 的高速增長， 2008 年第二季度，中國經濟的增速放緩至 10.1% 。這種下調很大程度上是中國對美國出口增長明顯減速的結果 ——2003 年到 2007 年之間，出口年均增幅超過 25% ；而此後， 2008 年 6 月年同比增長僅為 8% 。很明顯，約占中國總外需 20% 的以美國為核心的出口以及 GDP 增長都受到了擠壓。而與此相伴的是，中國對歐洲（ 2008 年 6 月增長 25% ）及日本（增長 22% ）的出貨量依然充滿活力。但由於日本及歐洲也在減弱，迄今為止在中國外需中較有活力的部分（合計占中國總出口額的 30% ）也將開始衰退。由於這些因素的拖累，中國的 GDP 增長極有可能在未來六個月內從 10% 進一步降至 8% 。

　　日本對外需衝擊的防禦也很脆弱。其 6 月的出口總量增長同比下跌 1.6% ，是 16 個月內首次走向負值。導致這一局麵的原因，是日本對歐洲及亞洲其他地區的出口也顯現出疲軟，而此前，這些一度活躍的市場還能掩飾日本對美國出口減弱的事實。主要由於上述原因，日本經濟的年增長率在 2008 年二季度收縮了 3% ，為七年以來最急劇的下降。

　　就亞洲對外的脆弱度來看，中國和日本恰位居兩個極端。中國擁有巨大的緩衝條件，過去兩年內接近 12% 的增長率可以抵擋住外需震蕩的打擊；相反，日本經濟近幾年來僅維持著 2% 的增長率，缺少中國那樣的緩衝。在外需走弱的環境下，中國經濟增長的底線可能在 8% 左右，而對於日本，則更可能接近於零。這就突顯出該地區最大的經濟體再度萌發衰退的明顯可能性。
　　

2002 年至 2007 年中期的全球經濟繁榮，是全球化強大的跨境聯接作用的自然結果。世界上沒有任何地區比出口導向型的亞洲從這種關聯性中獲益更多。該地區以中國為主導的飛速發展的經濟便是佐證。脫鉤（ decoupling ） —— 將發展中經濟體與發達世界的假設性分離 —— 與過去五年強大的全球化趨勢的核心理論背道而馳。無論在全球經濟周期的低穀還是高潮，這種全球化的關聯度都不受影響。通過發達的跨境反饋機製，在一個相互依存的世界裏，亞洲的出口導向型經濟體對美國需求減弱的反應，正在各地市場及經濟體中觸發強大的影響。

（三）經濟衰退 " 三部曲 "

　　金融危機及實體經濟衰退相互交錯的 " 三部曲 " ，掌握著未來幾年宏觀經濟前景的密鑰

　　

怎奈，全球經濟周期已經轉變。在 2004 年至 2007 年間，世界 GDP 年均增長率接近 5% ，是 20 世紀 70 年代以來全球增長最強勁的四年。而現在看來，未來幾年似乎又要回歸到 3.5% 的區間。雖然這也並非什麽災難性的結果，但確實意味著增長率比之前四年減速 30% 。
　

　全球經濟周期可能轉向低迷，這並非一則孤立事件。隨之而來的，是信貸市場危機的空前爆發，對世界金融市場構成極大破壞。金融市場和實體經濟間的相互影響，無疑掌握著未來幾年全球宏觀前景的密鑰。
　　

為便於解說，我現將這一繁複的過程分為三個階段：

　　信貸危機是第一階段。由 2007 年夏天開始的次貸危機引爆，一場跨產品的危機迅速蔓延至資產支持商業票據、抵押貸款證券（ MBS ）、結構型投資工具（ SIVs ）、銀行間同業（ LIBOR ）離岸融資、杠杆貸款市場、標售型利率證券（ ARS ）、所謂的單線保險商，以及其他眾多含混的產品及結構化產品。

　　不同於十年前那場跨境蔓延的亞洲金融危機，如今複雜的工具及結構型產品所具有的 " 起始及擴散 " （ originate anddistribute ，指貸款產品原形及包裝待售的證券化產品）的特性，最終也傳染了離岸投資者。這使當前的這場危機罕見地滋生了 " 既跨產品又跨境 " 的雙重特征。美國金融機構一向激進地減計 " 問題 " 證券的價值，同時，市場殘忍地處罰了那些在美國 " 後泡沫時代 " 的悲慘世界中首當其衝的金融機構，尤其是貝爾斯登、雷曼兄弟與美林。多半由於這個原因，我相信第一階段已經完成了大約 65% 。雖然我們已經經曆了這個曆程的大半部分，但隨著經濟周期的介入，我們仍有很多需要麵對，因為這將對金融中介機構的收入造成新一輪的打擊。

　　第二階段反映的是信貸及住房市場內爆對美國經濟實體麵的影響。如上所述，這一階段調整的表征可能是過分揮霍、儲蓄短缺、過度負債的美國消費者的屈從。近 15 年來，每年的實際消費增長平均接近 4% ，而隨著消費者開始重建以收入為基礎的儲蓄模式，並削減債務負擔，消費需求將出現曆時多年的下滑現已成為可能。

　　接下來的兩三年內，我認為消費趨勢增長率將減半至 2% 左右。甚至會有幾個季度，消費開支不能達標，而美國經濟也會陷入一種衰退的狀態。毫無疑問，也會有幾個季度消費增長高於 2% 這一標準，經濟也看似複蘇。但非常不幸的是，這樣的反彈對於 " 後泡沫時代 " 的美國消費者而言，猶如曇花一現。這方麵的宏觀調整方才上演。因此，依我之見，第二階段僅僅完成了 20% 左右。

　　第三階段需要放眼全球局麵 —— 美國消費業及世界其他國家之間的關聯更強調了這一點。同樣如上所述，這些關聯才剛剛開始發揮效用。訂貨及跨境運輸滯後，說明這一階段的調整將花去大量時間。

　　前期影響在中國及日本已經非常明顯 —— 很大程度上以美國肇始的出口調整為基礎；而在歐洲，連鎖反應才剛剛顯現，未來幾個月乃至幾個季度內，這種跨境影響將蓄勢待發。因此我認為第三階段僅完成了 10% 左右。

　　簡而言之，這場宏觀危機遠未結束。主要原因在於，已經破裂的房產和信貸泡沫變得如此之大，以至於最終傳染了美國經濟的實體麵。美國正調整適應更加艱難的後泡沫現實，相互依存、全球化的世界其他地區應當緊隨其後。

　　此外，各階段間還存在反饋效應 —— 特別是經濟周期現已開始施壓於那些在信貸危機中首當其衝的金融機構。銀行及其他貸款機構承受的新一輪收入壓力可能導致信貸緊縮進一步惡化，加重美國及世界上依賴貸款的經濟體麵臨的周期性壓力。

　　總之，宏觀調整應該持續至 2009 年，並有可能擴散至 2010 年。

（四）艱難的再平衡

　　由於不可持續的非理性增長已經停止，全球經濟將會麵臨一個曆時多年的再平衡過程

　　經濟繁榮的本性源於對經濟增長的貪婪渴求，而這種繁榮現已敗落。收入短缺的美國經濟拒絕緩慢的內需增長節奏；相反，它轉向了一種與曆史悠久的、源自生產力現狀的創收支柱不太相關的資產融資與債務融資的狂熱增長。

　　而對發展中世界而言，快速增長是脫離赤貧的一劑強力良方。正像發展中的亞洲所經曆的那樣，旺盛增長成為即便造成通貨膨脹、汙染、環境惡化、收入差距加大、以及周期性的資產泡沫等外部經濟的負麵效應，也要不擇手段地實現的目標。世界各國政府從前想要 —— 現在仍然想要增長，為此不惜付出任何代價。

　　但現在，是付賬的時候了。

　　全球經濟正麵臨一個曆時多年的再平衡曆程。對美國而言，拋棄其新發現的資產導向型儲蓄與消費相結合的策略，而重拾往昔的收入導向型儲蓄作為根基，這注定意味著個人消費增長將持續下滑。

　　然而希望是永遠存在的。弱勢美元令美國人順利地巧妙完成這場變奏 —— 現在，美國的消費主導型增長又將讓位於貨幣主導型的出口增長。一切皆有可能。但是鑒於美國的製造及出口產業已然經曆了多年的虛空，我對美國出口的複興甚為懷疑。一度 " 永遠消失 " 的工作機會和工業門類不會一夜複蘇。在我看來，美國現在將不得不認真應對更加緩慢的增長趨勢 —— 在未來兩三年內乃至更久， GDP 增長可能將從過去 13 年中的 3.2% 減速至 2% 以下。

　　這對世界其他地方而言，應是一個頗具挑戰性的結果 —— 特別是那些發展中國家。它們向過度揮霍的美國消費者出口商品，並從中獲得了太多的經濟給養。它們的目標在本質上與美國所麵臨的正好相反。出口導向型的發展中經濟體應該將增長方式轉向國內需求，特別是私人消費。這對那些依賴廉價貨幣、額外的儲蓄及基礎設施戰略而達到經濟大跨步發展的國家而言，並非易事。但是隨著美國這個它們的主要出口市場遭受到壓力，與世界其他地方一樣少有消費抵補，發展中世界幾乎別無選擇，隻好著手自身消費導向型的再平衡。這可能意味著發展中世界在接下來幾年內也將麵臨更加緩慢的經濟增長 —— 前幾年 7.3% 的年均增長率可能在未來兩三年內降至 5% 左右。

　　這樣的全球再平衡，源自經常賬戶赤字國與盈餘國之間幾年來的空前分化。按國際貨幣基金組織（ IMF ）的計算， 2006 年至 2007 年間，經常賬戶赤字的絕對值創紀錄地占到了世界 GDP 的 6% ，是 20 世紀 90 年代的三倍整，當時此項份額僅占 2% 。在我看來，那些為失衡辯護的人，其嚴重謬誤並非在於試圖用新的說辭來解釋這場空前的外部失衡，使之合理化；而是未能意識到資產和信貸泡沫在催生過剩問題上的影響。這些泡沫現已破裂，全球再平衡成為這個失衡世界的當務之急。毫無疑問，全球經濟也將為多年以來的疏忽付出慘重代價，未來幾年全球將走入更加緩慢的增長軌道。

（五）金融市場之鑒

　 　全球經濟還有許多要經曆的。從這個意義上說，眾多門類的金融資產 —— 股票、債券、貨幣及商品概莫能外

　　過去幾年的大事件對金融市場當然不無影響。如同前瞻性的貼現機製一樣，在過去幾年已展開的宏觀調整，現在都體現在主要資產類別的價格上。但是對通盤調整的抗拒依然根深蒂固。全球經濟還要經曆很多，從這個意義上說，金融市場也不外乎於此。

　　就此，有四條重要結論：

　　首先，全球大部分地區的股市都呈現熊市，很容易讓人斷言 " 最糟的時候已經過去 " 。我對這種預測很是懷疑。在我看來，我們不應該把股票市場當作同質資產的看待。然而，分清楚金融機構和非金融機構很重要。前者當然已經被打倒了。前文所述的第二階段和第三階段的調整將毫無疑問地給金融機構帶來周期性的收入壓力，這一遍體鱗傷的經濟部門可能正在經曆股價超調。然而非金融機構並非如此。比如，標準普爾 500 指數中的非金融機構，其 2007 年到 2008 年的一致收益預期仍然集中在 20% 左右。隨著美國經濟增長遲緩，我完全相信收益風險將觸及非金融機構 —— 凸顯出全球股票市場下一波重大下挫的明顯可能性。股票市場的熊市有可能從金融機構轉向非金融機構。

　　其次，對於債券，預測的關鍵取決於通貨膨脹及經濟增長風險的相互影響 —— 以及兩者的權衡對央行決策立場的暗示意義。由於通貨膨脹恐懼近來急劇攀升，市場參與者不相信各大央行將回歸更加激進的貨幣政策立場，主權政府債券收益率有所上漲。在增長緩滯的環境中，我覺得對周期性通貨膨脹的恐懼最終將會停息，貨幣管理當局也會因顧慮針對通脹下藥過猛而不安。短期看來，我得出這樣的結論，再度審視央行激進的緊縮政策之後，我認為主要債券市場有可能重整旗鼓。中期看來 —— 也就是審視本輪周期 —— 我承認陪審團還在庭外爭論滯脹風險 —— 特別是針對有通貨膨脹傾向的發展中國家。在這段時間內，債券市場的預測會更加不確定。

　　再次，在貨幣方麵，美元仍能保持其舞台中心的地位。六年多來，我一直看淡美元，原因隻有一個：美國巨額的經常賬戶赤字。盡管美國的對外差額在過去一年半以來 —— 多半由於周期性原因 —— 降至 GDP 的 5% 左右，但該差額仍然過於龐大。因此，我從根本上還是看淡美元。同時，在過去的 12 個月裏，由於懼怕次貸僅僅是美國的問題，因此美元似乎被過度地貶抑了。全球對這場宏觀危機的反應按上文所述展開，我相信投資者會重新思量之前的觀點，即他們可以從歐元或日元資產中尋求庇護。因此，我能預想，美元實際上會穩定下來，甚至將在 2008 年底維持強勢，之後將因其依然龐大的經常賬戶赤字而在 2009 年重新恢複下跌。

　　最後，商品市場的前景近來成為熱門話題。一年之後，我相信，對經濟變化較為敏感的商品 —— 石油、基礎金屬及其他工業原料 —— 其價格將遠遠低於其今天的價格。 " 軟商品 "—— 主要是農產品 —— 以及貴金屬也許是例外。對經濟變化較為敏感的 " 硬商品 " 將出現調整，原因有二：全球增長明顯減速將相對改善供需失衡的狀況，追逐收益的財務投資人將在商品購買上撤資。以我之見，後者對商品泡沫的推動力不可小覷。有觀點認為對衝基金及其他投機者導致了商品市場過剩，對此我無法苟同。相反，真正起作用的主要是那些僅作長期投資且有現錢的機構投資者，比如全球養老基金 —— 他們無一例外地接受顧問的建議，增加對商品類資產的資產配置。機構投資者的這種群羊效應常常被證明是錯誤的。我想這次也是如此 —— 其趨勢似乎已經顯現出來。

（六）讓瘋狂延續？

　 　美國政府似乎並不願意深入探討問題的嚴重性，即便它們已在這場危機中達到頂峰。從稅收政策、對住房市場進行的 " 調整 " 以及金融係統的管理來看，確實如此

　　由於上述原因，圍繞當前這場金融危機，幾乎不乏各類極端描述。而它是否真如很多人宣稱的，是大蕭條以來最糟的一次崩盤，仍有待觀察。但在很多重要方麵，它的確堪稱一則分水嶺事件 —— 特別是因為它提出了一個尖銳的質疑：長久以來忽略了失衡及過剩問題的美國經濟，其根本支柱究竟是什麽？不幸的是，美國的政府部門看似既不願意、也沒能力深入探討此類問題的嚴重性，即便它們已在這場危機中達到了頂峰。

　　稅收政策便是佐證。向本已過度揮霍的美國消費者實行退稅，成為了 " 第一道防線 " ，現在美國政府又在討論第二輪的激勵措施。然而，鑒於 2007 年美國個人消費開支已經創紀錄地占到當年實際 GDP 的 72% ，政府向市場注入可支配收入，就會延續此番現代曆史上最大的消費狂潮。對於一個為了償還債務、降低巨額經常賬戶赤字，迫切需要增大儲蓄、降低開支的國家而言，降低個人稅收的政策無疑是一個在錯誤時機開出的錯誤藥方。

　　美國政府對住房市場危機的反應也同樣存疑。國會堅決把避免住房遭到強製拍賣作為處理一切問題的重要原則；此外，新立法為低收入家庭住房貸款融資提供了高達 3000 億美元的政府擔保。這與美國政府的施政理念一致，即一直以來將不斷提高住房擁有率，作為公共政策的核心目標之一。雖然如此，次貸危機中的一個非常明顯又令人心痛的教訓就是，有一些美國人就是買不起房子的。喪失抵押品贖回權、住房遭到強製拍賣，是非理性購房行為的不幸後果，但最終，也是其必然的結局。對於這場住房市場泡沫中的低收入受害者而言，應該在收入上給予支持，而非延續其在經濟上並不合理的住房所有權。但是國會選擇采取後一種舉措，這就抑製了房價的必要下跌。而這一下跌過程對於市場出清，以及住房市場危機的終結，終將變得十分必要。

　　另外，財政當局 —— 美聯儲及美國財政部 —— 在這場危機中也沒有傑出的作為。十年前是一支對衝基金（長期資本管理公司） " 太大了而不能允許倒掉 " ；現在則是一家投資銀行（貝爾斯登），以及國內貸款機構中的兩大巨獸（房利美和房地美）。加之對於近期雷曼兄弟倒閉的通融，美聯儲這一為政府證券一級交易商開設的臨時流動性工具，看上去越發不像臨時的了。

　　毫無顧忌的冒險是釀成危機的泡沫的核心因素。而通過對泡沫破裂的後果進行幹涉，管理當局其實是在庇護不負責任的冒險者，也因此助長了日益紮根於當今金融文化中的 " 道德風險 " 。與此同時，在貨幣政策的製定過程中始終忽略資產泡沫風險的美聯儲，對金融市場遭受的危害、以及變得日益依賴資產的美國經濟，同樣負有責任。

　　簡而言之，美國政府在應對這場金融危機的過程中，采取了以政令為主導的事後補救措施。政策方案均依照眼下的狀況製定，而沒有根據美國經濟重回可持續性發展道路所需的必要條件，進行戰略評估。最後，在一個七拚八湊的補救方案中，過度消費、低儲蓄、不切實際的住房所有權目標、以及金融市場中的道德風險統統得以延續。它的一個最大的缺陷就是，對於不良行為束手無策。美國政府根本沒有銘記經濟危機的痛苦教訓，也沒有從一開始就采取行動去阻止過剩的蔓延，而是讓美國首當其衝，陷入過剩及其連鎖反應造成的混亂。

　　如果說這次危機意味著什麽，它是一記警鍾。長久以來，美國破壞了很多作為一個領先經濟體所要遵循的至關重要的行為準則。首先它未能實現儲蓄；再者，它用股市和住房市場的資產泡沫支撐空前的消費過剩；其後，它為維持消費而深陷債務泥沼；最後，為了填補資金差額，它向世界其他地區大量借貸。在這場狂熱的消費大潮中，管理當局亦有同謀之嫌 —— 特別中央銀行，它寬恕激進冒險行為，並對貨幣政策進行了過度調適。

　　美國將其本該難以為繼的狀態持續得越久，就越執迷於維持自身永久存在的魔力。這場危機傳遞出的真實信息是，遊戲現已結束；然而華盛頓的政客們慣於否認事實、又在政治味十足的總統大選之年感受到選民們的熱情，於是他們堅稱遊戲可以繼續。

　　美國現在需要 " 嚴厲的愛 " 勝過一切。這是一項新課程，需要對多年以來的過度揮霍坦然承認，並認識到這種揮霍現在需要補救。不難推測，新舉措可能涵蓋的框架大體包括了增加儲蓄，並增加對人才及基礎設施的投資；再囊括一項能源政策也是不錯的 —— 隻是金融係統的監管人員需要更謹慎才行。

　　無疑，這項提議不會贏得任何人氣競賽。但最終，它將是美國人在後泡沫時期實現可持續繁榮的唯一希望。

（七）前景使人憂

　　如果所有國家的管理當局選擇此類以政令為主的權宜之計，執著於快速經濟增長是解決所有問題的良方，世界將錯過一個重新整飭的良機

　　其實，這些本都是可以避免的。美國玩得過了火，而其他依賴出口的國家也十分樂意湊湊熱鬧。全球經濟的守護者 —— 各國決策者和監管者們對此坐視不理，聽憑整個係統失控。投資者、商人、金融機構以及消費者，都成為 " 過剩時代 " 的積極參與者。

　　而今後的關鍵問題在於，我們這個相互適應並且日益相互關聯的全球係統，是否能從這次宏觀震蕩中汲取深刻的教訓。這種自我評價的核心必須是，對追求開放式經濟增長的後果，要有更為深入的認識。美國若僅依靠國內創收這種傳統方式，就無法達到其增長目標，因而它轉向一種依賴資產和債務的全新增長模式。而依賴出口的亞洲發展中國家也將其儲蓄主導的增長模型發揮到極致：不願或者不能刺激國內個人消費，額外的資本經再循環，就進入基礎設施建設或化為美元資產 —— 實際就是將具有超級競爭力的貨幣與出口品，強行轉化為新一輪發展的源泉。

　　這場危機發出一個強烈的信號：這些策略都將難以為繼。它們導致了不同層麵上的過剩 —— 世界最大經濟體內部或相互間的內、外需失衡現象及其相互作用，更加凸顯了這一點。這些策略利用不可持續的信貸和風險泡沫，將係統固定在一種不穩定的均衡狀態下。但是現在，泡沫破裂了，暴露出一種令人擔憂的不均衡。它需要決策方式的更新，也要求家庭、企業、金融市場參與者在行為上做出重大轉變。

　　而這種新的決策方式在一開始表現並不如人意，尤其是在美國和中國 —— 新一輪全球化中的兩大經濟體。如上所述，華盛頓正返身將問題訴諸陳腐的藥方，致使過去十年中的過度消費和道德風險問題得以延續。而隨著 9 月 15 日的降息舉措，北京也發出了支持經濟增長的新信號 —— 鑒於中國的通貨膨脹問題將持續存在，這一發展趨勢頗為令人擔憂。兩國政體都固執地依附於自身的核心價值觀 —— 快速的經濟增長是解決任何乃至所有問題的良方。對於這種增長方式可持續性的擔憂，則一律 " 改日再談 " 。

　　金融、經濟危機經常決定了曆史中某些最重要的轉折點。它們可能是我們汲取曆史經驗的過程中最為痛苦的階段；然而，認真思考這些教訓，並排除可能引發危機的係統性風險，其必要性是不可忽視的。但是如此繁重的任務往往難與國家政令保持協調一致。一條阻力最小的路徑往往會被選中，並由此導致更多被動的回應 —— 這種權宜之計雖然可以立即調整混亂，但卻對解決根本的係統性問題毫無幫助。如果所有國家的管理當局隻是選擇此類以政令為主的權宜之計 —— 例如對已然過度消費的美國消費者實施退稅、對具通脹傾向的發展中經濟體放鬆貨幣政策，以及創造更多的資產泡沫 —— 那麽世界將錯過一個重新整飭的良機。這將成為最大的悲劇。

作者史蒂芬·羅奇（Stephen S. Roach）為摩根士丹利亞洲主席

Pitfalls and Precepts in a Post-Bubble World

Stephen S. Roach, chairman of Morgan Stanley Asia

Caijing Magazine 

September 19, 2008

http://english.caijing.com.cn/2008-09-19/110014166.html

 

 

The world's worsening financial crisis was fed by U.S. consumer excess and Developing Asia's export model. Have we learned?

 

A year ago, we had barely an inkling of what would transpire in the world's financial markets and the global economy. There were some early warning signs that all was not well in the subprime slice of the U.S. mortgage market. But, as we saw with the dotcom bubble in early 2000, subprime was widely considered of little consequence for the macroeconomic story.

 

Denial, one of the most powerful human emotions, once again had the upper hand. The broad consensus of consumers, business people, policy makers and politicians ignored simmering problems on the subprime front, and believed that the global boom of the preceding four years was very much intact.

 

The argument a year ago was laced with a painful sense of déjà vu.  At the end of 1999, dotcom accounted for only six percent of the market capitalization of U.S. equities. A powerful, flexible and innovative U.S. economy was believed to offer built-in resilience and ongoing support to the other 94 percent of the U.S. equity market and the macroeconomy. A year ago, subprime accounted for only 14 percent of total, securitized mortgage debt outstanding. A still powerful, flexible and innovative U.S. economy was once again believed to offer ongoing support to the other 86 percent of the mortgage market and the broader economy.

 

How wrong this logic was – in 2000 and, again, just a year ago.  Eight and a half years ago, the bursting of the dotcom bubble was, in fact, followed by a 49 percent decline in the broader S&P 500 index over the next two and a half years. And the bursting of the subprime bubble a year ago has triggered an unprecedented contagion throughout the broader credit and capital markets, toppling many of the once proud icons of American finance – first Bear Stearns, and now Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch.

 

The lessons are painfully similar. When an entire asset class – or for that matter, an economy – goes to excess, the weakest link in the chain often deals a decisive blow to the system as a whole.  The bubble analogy works all too well. When the thinnest part of the membrane gives way, the rest of the air quickly escapes.

 

But the imagery misses one critical point. The progression of market bubbles is an insidious process. From equities to property to credit, the bubbles have expanded in scope and risk. A bubble-prone U.S. economy became a breeding ground for a gathering storm of systemic risks in America and in our increasingly interdependent world economy. Now we are left to pick up the pieces.

 

In the Beginning

 

No economy can live beyond its means in perpetuity. Yet like others that have tried to do so in the past, the United States thought it was different. America's current account deficit surged to 6 percent of GDP in 2006 from 1.5 percent in 1995. When its annual deficit reached a peak US$ 844 billion in the third quarter 2006, the United States required US$ 3.4 billion in capital inflows from abroad each business day to fund its massive shortfall in domestic savings. 

 

For the longest time, such funding was there for the asking. There were plenty of new theories concocted to rationalize why the unsustainable might actually be sustainable. Foreign lending with impunity was a special privilege that fell to the nation possessing the world's reserve currency, many argued. Some went further, celebrating the advent of a new, Bretton Woods II arrangement, whereby surplus savers such as China could forever recycle excess dollars into U.S. assets to keep their currencies competitive and their export-led growth models thriving. In the end, of course, these "new paradigm" explanations – like those of the past – failed the test of time and the markets.

 

At the root of the problem was America's audacious shift from income- to asset-based saving. The U.S. consumer led the charge, with trend growth in consumer demand hitting 3.5 percent per annum in real terms over 14 years, from 1994 to 2007. It was the greatest buying binge over such a protracted period for any economy in modern history.

 

Never mind a seemingly chronic shortfall of income generation, with real disposable personal income growth averaging just 3.2 percent over the same period. American consumers no longer felt they had to save the old-fashioned way; they drew down income-based saving rates to zero for the first time since the Great Depression. And why not? After all, they had uncovered the alchemy of a new asset-based saving strategy: first out of equities in the latter half of the 1990s, and then out of housing in the first half of the current decade. Lax regulatory and supervisory oversight, in conjunction with excessive monetary accommodation, resulted in an explosion of free and easy credit, which turned out to be the icing on a toxic cake.

 

In retrospect, the equity wealth effect was child's play compared to what the American home market eventually offered. At its peak in mid-2006, net equity extraction from residential property had soared to nearly 9 percent of disposable personal income – fully three times the 3 percent registered only five years earlier. That enabled income-short American consumers not only to ignore the imperatives of income-based saving but also to push consumption up to a record 72 percent of real GDP in 2007. Behind this trend was the confluence of two monstrous bubbles – property and credit – that transformed residential dwellings into the functional equivalent of ATM machines.

 

In the end, U.S. consumers had no compunction about tapping their main source of future savings – housing wealth – to fund current consumption. And they went on a record debt binge to pull it off. Household sector indebtedness surged to 133 percent of disposable personal income by year-end 2007, up more than 40 percentage points from the 90 percent debt loads prevailing just a decade earlier. It was the height of folly. Yet the longer it lasted, the more it became deeply ingrained in the American psyche. Now it's over.

 

The Asia Connection

 

While seemingly made in America, the era of excess was truly global in scope. The U.S. consumption binge was fodder to export-led economies elsewhere in the world. That was especially the case in Developing Asia – the fastest growing major region in the world since the turn of the century. Large enough to account for fully 20 percent of total world output (as measured on a purchasing power parity basis), real GDP growth in Developing Asia averaged 8 percent over the 2000-'07 period – more than two and a half times the 3 percent growth trend elsewhere in the world over the same period. In search of rapid growth to achieve its development and poverty reduction objectives, Developing Asia viewed America's consumption binge as "manna from heaven." Consumption deficient Japan had a similar response, as did the region's large and newly industrialized economies such as Taiwan and Korea.

  

Yet there can be no mistaking the high-octane fuel that drove the Asian growth boom – an increasingly powerful, export-led growth dynamic. For Developing Asia as a whole, exports in 2007 hit a record of more than 45 percent of pan-regional GDP – up more than 10 percentage points from the share prevailing in the mid-1990s. That left the world's fastest growing region more dependent on external demand than ever before. And with the American consumer in trouble, Asia's export-led growth dynamic is now at risk.

 

China is undoubtedly a key player in that regard. After posting nearly 12 percent GDP growth in the years 2006 and '07, Chinese growth slowed to 10.1 percent in the second quarter 2008. That downshift was largely the result of a marked deceleration in the growth of Chinese exports to the United States – up 8 percent year-on-year in June 2008 following average annual gains of more than 25 percent over the 2003-'07 period. Significantly, the U.S.-centric compression of Chinese export and GDP growth – hitting about 20 percent of China's total external demand – was accompanied by ongoing vigor in China's shipments to Europe (up 25 percent in June 2008) and Japan (up 22 percent). However, as Japan and Europe are now weakening, the heretofore resilient areas for Chinese external demand – collectively accounting for about 30 percent of China's total exports – also will begin to falter. With lags, that could well prompt another downleg in Chinese GDP growth to 8 percent from 10 percent within the next six to nine months. 

 

Japan is also highly vulnerable to external demand shock. Overall Japanese export volume growth went into negative territory in June (down 1.6 percent year-on-year) for the first time in 16 months. At work in this case was emerging sluggishness in Japanese exports to Europe and elsewhere in Asia, which were once resilient markets that previously masked the emerging weakness in the United States. Largely as a result, the Japanese economy contracted at a 3 percent annual rate in the second quarter 2008 – the sharpest decline in seven years.

 

China and Japan are at opposite ends of Asia's external vulnerability chain. China has a huge cushion after solid growth over the past two years to ward off the blow of an external shock.  Japan, by contrast, has been only a 2 percent growth economy in recent years and has no such cushion. In a weaker external demand climate, the downside to Chinese economic growth appears to be around 8 percent. For Japan, the downside is probably closer to zero, underscoring the distinct possibility of a recessionary relapse in the region's largest economy.

 

The global boom of 2002 to mid-'07 was an outgrowth of the powerful cross-border linkages of globalization. No region of the world benefited more from this connectedness than export-led Asia. That has been especially the case in the region's high-flying developing economies, dominated by China. Decoupling – the supposed untethering of developing economies from the developed world – is antithetical to the linkages that have become central to the powerful globalization trends of the past five years. These linkages are just as intact on the downside as on the upside of the global business cycle. And through well-developed, cross-border feedback mechanisms, the responses to a major weakening in U.S. demand by Asia's export-led economies are now triggering powerful repercussions across markets and economies in an interdependent world.

 

Taking Stock

 

Alas, the global business cycle has turned. World GDP growth, which averaged close to 5 percent annually over the 2004-'07 period – the strongest four consecutive years of global growth since the early 1970s – now seems headed back down into the 3.5 percent range for a couple of years. While that is hardly a disastrous outcome, it does represent a 30 percent deceleration in the growth rate compared with the previous four years. 

 

This likely downturn in the global business cycle has not occurred in a vacuum. It has been accompanied by an unprecedented outbreak of credit market contagion that has wreaked havoc throughout the world's financial markets. But understanding the three stages of interplay between financial markets and the real economy is a key to forecasting the global macroeconomic outlook for the next few years.

 

The credit crisis is the first stage. Sparked by the sub-prime meltdown that began in summer 2007, a cross-product contagion quickly spread to asset-backed commercial paper, mortgage-backed securities, structured investment vehicles, interbank offshore financing, leveraged lending markets, auction rate securities, so-called monoline insurers, and a number of other opaque products and structures. Unlike the Asian financial crisis of 10 years earlier, which also involved a powerful cross-border contagion, the "originate and distribute" characteristics of the latest complex instruments and structures wound up infecting offshore investors as well. That puts the current crisis in the rarefied breed of being shaped both by cross-product and cross-border viruses.

 

U.S. financial institutions generally have been aggressive in marking down the value of distressed securities. And the markets have been brutal in penalizing those financial institutions that eventually were most exposed to America's post-bubble carnage – especially Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch.  Largely for those reasons, I believe this first phase is about 65 percent complete. More is behind us than ahead of us, but there is still a good deal more to come as the business cycle now kicks in and produces yet another round of earnings impairments for financial intermediaries.

 

The second stage reflects the impacts of the credit and housing implosions on the real side of the U.S. economy. Thus far, those impacts have largely been concentrated in residential construction activity. As noted above, however, the main event in this phase of the adjustment is the likely capitulation of the overextended, low-saving, excessively indebted U.S. consumer. For nearly a decade and a half, real consumption growth averaged close to 4 percent per year. As consumers now move to rebuild income based saving and prune debt burdens, a multiyear downshift in consumer demand is likely. Over the next two to three years, I expect trend consumption growth rates to be cut in half to around 2 percent.

 

There will be quarters when consumer spending falls short of that bogey and the U.S. economy lapses into a recessionary state. There will undoubtedly be quarters when consumption growth is faster than the 2 percent norm, and it will appear that a recovery is under way. Such rebounds, unfortunately, can be expected to prove short-lived for post-bubble American consumers. This aspect of the macro-adjustment scenario has only begun. As a result, in my view, the second phase is only about 20 percent complete.

 

The third stage is a global phase – underscored by the linkages between U.S. consumers and the rest of the world. As noted, those linkages are only now just beginning to play out. Ordering and cross-border shipping lags suggest this phase of the adjustment will take a good deal of time to unfold. Early impacts are already evident in China and Japan, largely on the basis of U.S.-led export adjustments. With ripple effects now only beginning to show up in Europe, these cross-border impacts should gather in force over the months and quarters to come. That suggests to me that Phase III is only about 10 percent complete.

 

In short, this macroeconomic crisis is far from over. The main reason is that the bubbles that have burst – property and credit – became so big they ended up infecting the real side of the U.S. economy. And as the United States now adjusts to much tougher post-bubble realities, the rest of the interdependent, globalized world can be expected to follow. Moreover, there are undoubtedly feedback effects between the various stages – especially as the business cycle now starts to bear down on financial institutions that were initially buffeted by the credit contagion. A new round of earnings pressures on banks and other lending institutions could exacerbate the credit crunch further, reinforcing the cyclical pressures on debt-dependent economies in the United States and around the world. As a result, macroeconomic adjustments should last well into 2009 and possibly spill over into 2010.

 

Rebalancing Act

 

A voracious appetite for economic growth lies at the heart of the boom that has now gone bust. An income-short U.S. economy rejected a slower pace of domestic demand. It turned, instead, to an asset- and debt-financed growth binge that had little to do with the time-honored underpinnings of income generation forthcoming from current production. For the developing world, rapid growth was a powerful antidote to a legacy of wrenching poverty. And the hyper-growth that was realized in regions like Developing Asia became the end that justified all means, including the negative externalities of inflation, pollution, environmental degradation, widening income disparities, and periodic asset bubbles. The world's body politic wanted – and still wants – growth at all costs.  But now the bill is coming due as the global economy faces a multi-year rebalancing, and reins in its appetite.

 

For the United States, this rebalancing will mean a sustained deceleration in personal consumption growth, as households abandon newfound asset-dependent saving and consumption strategies in favor of the income-led fundamentals of the past.  Hope springs eternal that a weaker dollar will enable America to finesse this transition without skipping a beat; that consumer-led growth will now give way to currency-led export growth.

 

Anything is possible, but I have my doubts about a U.S. export renaissance, especially in the aftermath of a decades-long hollowing of America's manufacturing and export base. Jobs and industries that were "lost forever" do not spring back to life overnight. The United States, in my view, will now have to come to grips with a much slower growth trajectory, with real GDP growth likely to slow from the 3.2 percent trend of the past 13 years to no higher than 2 percent over the next two to three years, or longer.

 

This should prove to be a very challenging outcome for the rest of the world, especially for those developing nations that derived so much of their economic sustenance from exporting goods to over-extended American consumers. Their task is essentially the opposite of what the United States faces. Export-led developing economies must shift the mix of growth toward domestic demand, especially private consumption. That won't be easy for nations who have relied on cheap currencies, surplus saving and infrastructure strategies as the principal means to achieve spectacular progress on the road to economic development. But with their major export market – the United States – now under pressure, and with little consumption offset likely elsewhere in the world, the developing world has little choice than to embark on a consumer-led rebalancing of its own. This probably means slower economic growth in the developing world for the next several years, with the 7.3 percent average annual growth pace of past years conceivably slowing into the 5 percent vicinity over the next two to three years. 

 

Such global rebalancing arises from an unprecedented disparity that opened over the past several years between nations with current account deficits and those with surpluses. By the International Monetary Fund's reckoning, the absolute sum of current account balances hit a record of nearly 6 percent of global GDP in 2006-'07 – fully three times the 2 percent share prevailing in the mid-1990s. Apologists went seriously wrong, in my view, not by finding new ways to rationalize unprecedented external imbalances, but in failing to appreciate the impact of asset and credit bubbles in spawning these excesses. Now that those bubbles have burst, global rebalancing has become an urgent task in a lopsided world. And the global economy will undoubtedly pay a steep price for this long period of neglect by moving toward a much slower growth trajectory in the years immediately ahead.

 

Financial Market Implications

 

The events of the past year have certainly not been lost on financial markets. As forward-looking discounting mechanisms, much of the macroeconomic adjustments that unfolded are now "in the price" of major asset classes. But there remains deep denial about the full extent of the adjustments. To the extent that there is more trouble to come for the global economy, the same can be said for the broad classes of financial assets: equities, bonds, currencies and commodities. 

  

With equity markets now in bear market territory in most of the world, it is tempting to conclude that the worst is over. I am suspicious about that prognosis. The trick, in my view, is to resist the temptation to view equity markets as a homogenous asset class. Instead, it is important to make a distinction between financials and non-financials. The former certainly have been beaten down. While the adjustments of Phases II and III undoubtedly will put more cyclical pressure on the earnings of financial institutions, share prices for this bruised and battered sector of the economy may now be moving into overshoot territory.

 

That is not the case for non-financials, however. For example, consensus earnings expectations for the non-financials component of the S&P 500 are still centered on prospects of around 20 percent earnings growth through 2007-'08.  As U.S. economic growth falters, however, I fully expect earnings risks to tip to the downside for non-financials, underscoring the distinct possibility of yet another important downleg for global equity markets. As a consequence, the bear equity market could well shift from financials to non-financials.

 

For bonds, the prognosis centers on the interplay between inflation and growth risks – and the implications of such a tradeoff for the policy stances of central banks. As inflation fears mounted recently, yields on sovereign government bonds rose while market participants started discounting a return to more aggressive monetary policies among major central banks. In a faltering growth climate, however, I suspect cyclical inflation fears will end up being overblown and monetary authorities, fearing overkill, will turn skittish. Over the near term, that leads me to conclude that major bond markets could rally somewhat further on the heels of a rethinking of the aggressive central bank tightening scenario. Over the medium term – namely, looking through the cycle – I concede that the jury is still out on stagflation risks, especially in inflation-prone developing economies. The bond market prognosis is more uncertain beyond that time horizon.

 

For currencies, the dollar remains at center stage. I have been a dollar bear for more than six years for one reason: America's massive current account deficit. Although the U.S. external shortfall has been reduced somewhat over the past year and a half – largely for cyclical reasons – to 5 percent of GDP, it is still far too large. So I remain fundamentally bearish on the dollar. At the same time, it appears the dollar overshot on the downside during the first 12 months of the subprime crisis largely on the basis that subprime was mainly a U.S. problem. As the global repercussions of the macroeconomic crisis spread, I believe investors will rethink the belief that they can seek refuge in euro- and yen-denominated assets. That rethinking has already begun, prompting a significant rally for the dollar in recent weeks that could well continue through end of 2008. Once a more synchronous global growth outcome is built into the relative price structure of foreign exchange rates, I suspect the dollar will resume its decline in early 2009 due to America's still oversized current account deficit.

 

The commodity market outlook is especially topical these days. A year from now, I believe economically sensitive commodity prices such as oil, base metals and other industrial materials will be a good deal lower than today. Soft commodities, mainly agricultural products, as well as precious metals could well be exceptions to that outcome. Two reasons underpin the case for a correction for economically sensitive hard commodities: a marked deceleration in global growth leading to a related improvement in the supply-demand imbalance; and a pullback in commodity buying by return-seeking investors. This second impetus to the commodity bubble cannot be underestimated, in my opinion. I am not sympathetic to the view that hedge funds and other speculators have driven commodity markets to excess. At work, instead, are mainly long-term, real money institutional investors such as global pension funds, all of whom have been advised by consultants to increase their asset allocations in commodities as an asset class.  Such herding behavior by institutional investors invariably turns out wrong. I expect that to be the case this time as well – and the trend appears to be under way. 

 

Perpetuating the Madness?

  

For reasons noted above, the current financial crisis is hardly lacking in superlatives. Whether it is truly the worst debacle since the Great Depression, as many have argued, remains to be seen.  But it is certainly a watershed event in many important respects, especially since it draws into sharp question the fundamental underpinnings of a U.S. economy that has long ignored its imbalances and excesses. Sadly, America's body politic seems neither willing nor able to fathom the magnitude of the problems that have come to a head in this crisis. That's true whether one considers tax policy, the housing "fix," or financial system management.

 

Tax policy is a case a point. Rebates to overextended American consumers have been the first line of defense, and there is new talk in Washington of a second round of such a stimulus measure. Yet with personal consumer spending hitting a record 72 percent of real GDP in 2007, the government's contributions to disposable income are aimed at perpetuating the biggest consumption binge in modern history. For a nation that desperately needs to save more and spend less – and thereby pay down debt and reduce its massive current account deficit – politically expedient personal tax cuts are the wrong medicine at the wrong time. 

 

Washington's response to the housing crisis is equally problematic.  Congress is determined to make foreclosure containment a key aspect of any fix; new legislation provides government guarantees for up to US$ 300 billion in home mortgage refinancing packages for low-income families. This is consistent with a philosophy that has long stressed ever-rising rates of homeownership as a key objective of U.S. public policy. Yet truth be known, an obvious and painful lesson of the subprime crisis is that there are some Americans who simply cannot afford to buy a home.

 

Foreclosure is a tragic, but ultimately necessary, consequence of misguided home buying. For low-income victims of the housing bubble, assistance should be directed at income support rather than at perpetuating uneconomic homeownership. By opting for the latter, Congress is inhibiting the requisite decline in home prices that ultimately will be necessary to clear the market and bring the housing crisis to an end.

 

Nor have the financial authorities – the Federal Reserve and the U.S. Department of Treasury – distinguished themselves in this crisis. Ten years ago, it was a hedge fund (Long Term Capital Management) that was too big to fail. Now these include an investment bank (Bear Stearns) and the country's twin mortgage behemoths (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac). And, courtesy of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, the Fed's so-called temporary liquidity facility for primary dealers in government securities is now starting to look less and less temporary. 

 

Undisciplined risk taking was a central element of the bubbles that spawned this crisis. By tempering the consequences of the bursting of the risk bubble, authorities are shielding irresponsible risk takers and thereby enabling a "moral hazard" that has become increasingly ingrained in today's financial culture. At the same time, a Federal Reserve that continues to ignore the perils of asset bubbles in the setting of monetary policy is equally guilty of reckless endangerment to the financial markets and to an increasingly asset-dependent U.S. economy.

 

In short, Washington has responded to this financial crisis with a politically driven, reactive approach. Policy initiatives have been framed more by circumstances of the moment than by strategic assessments of what it truly takes to put the U.S. economy back on a more sustainable path. By perpetuating excessive consumption, low saving rates, unrealistic goals of home ownership and moral hazards in financial markets, this patchwork approach includes the worst of flaws: It does little to change bad behavior. Far from heeding the tough lessons of an economy in crisis, Washington now is doing little to break the daisy chain of excess that got America in this mess in the first place.

 

If this crisis is anything, it is a wake-up call. For all too long, the United States broke many of the most important rules of conduct for a leading economy. It failed to save. It levered asset bubbles in both equities and homes to sustain unparalleled excess in consumption. It went deeply into debt to sustain that course of action and borrowed heavily from the rest of the world to close the funding gap. Complicity in this binge has been shared by the authorities, especially a central bank that condoned unbridled risk taking and excessive monetary accommodation.

 

The longer the United States sustained the unsustainable, the more it believed in the perpetuity of its charmed existence. The real message of this crisis is that this game is now over. But steeped in denial and feeling the heat of voters in a politically charged presidential election year, Washington's politicians insist the game can go on.

 

More than anything, America now needs "tough love" – a new course that owns up to years of excess. It is not difficult to fathom the broad outlines of what such a new approach might entail, such as more saving, as well as more investment in people and infrastructure. An energy policy might be nice as well, as would more prudent stewardship of the financial system. A program based on these elements would not win any popularity contests. But in the end, it is America's only hope for sustainable, post-bubble prosperity. 

 

Tough Lessons

 

It didn't have to be this way. America went too far, and an export-dependent world was more than happy to go along for the ride. Policy makers and regulators – stewards of the global economy – looked the other way and allowed the system to veer out of control. Investors, business people, financial institutions and consumers were all active participants in this Era of Excess. 

 

A key question going forward is whether an adaptive and increasingly interrelated global system will learn the tough lessons of this macroeconomic upheaval. At the heart of this self-appraisal must be greater awareness of the consequences of striving for open-ended economic growth. The United States couldn't hit its growth target the old fashioned way by relying on internal income generation, so it turned to a new asset- and debt-dependent growth model. Export dependent Developing Asia took its saving-led growth model to excess. Unwilling or unable to stimulate internal private consumption at home, surplus capital was recycled into infrastructure and dollar-based assets which, in effect, forced super-competitive currencies and exports to become the sustenance of a new development recipe. 

 

Can the world learn the tough lessons of this upheaval? The United States and China are likely to hold the keys to the answer.

 

This crisis is a strong signal of strategies that are not sustainable.  They led to multiple layers of excess, underscored by a precarious interplay between internal and external imbalances within and between the world's largest economies. It took unsustainable credit and risk bubbles to hold this system together in an unstable equilibrium. But now the bubbles have burst, unmasking a worrisome disequilibrium that demands a new approach to policy and an important shift in behavior by households, businesses and financial market participants.

 

The early verdict on such a new approach is not encouraging.  That's especially the case in the United States and China, which are two key players for today's globalization. As noted, Washington is reverting to timeworn recipes that perpetuate the excess consumption and moral hazard problems of the past decade.  And by cutting policy interest rates on September 15, Beijing has sent new pro-growth signals – an especially disconcerting development in light of China's ongoing problems on the inflation front. The body politic in each nation is clinging steadfastly to its core values, claiming that rapid economic growth is the antidote to any and all problems. Concerns regarding the sustainability of that growth are being deferred to "another day."

 

Financial and economic crises often define history's greatest turning points. Though painful, they can be the ultimate learning experiences. But there can be no denying the urgent need to learn from these lessons and address the systemic risks that led to the crisis. Such heavy lifting rarely sits well with the body politic. A path of least resistance is invariably selected, leading to more of a knee-jerk response; a quick fix that tempers immediate dislocations but does little to tackle deep-rooted systemic problems.

 

If all the authorities can do is opt for politically expedient fixes -- such as tax rebates for overextended American consumers, lax monetary and currency policies for inflation prone developing economies, and the creation of more asset bubbles – the world will have squandered a critical opportunity to put its house in order. That would be the greatest tragedy of all.