白俄羅斯未開一槍而發動的戰爭
The War Belarus Wages Without Firing a Shot
By: Giorgio Provinciali
Live from Ukraine
Ovruch — From the Belarusian border, new roads and artillery positions are visible, and drones are arriving.
No soldiers yet, but this may not be the point.
Commenting on the latest report from the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Oleksandr Syrskyj, President Zelensky confirmedthat the Russian Federation may be attempting to drag Belarus back into war.
According to publicly available intelligence, Belarusian engineers are building roads into Ukrainian territory and establishing artillery positions along the border.
This could be a diversion to keep the Ukrainian military on alert, prompting central command to move more troops north and away from the steeper slopes where the Russian Armed Forces are refusing to advance, even at enormous human cost. However, among civilians in Ovruch and other border towns, the risk of a repeat of the scenario seen in February 2022 is considered real, especially after Belarusian dictator Aliaksandr Lukashenko called on reservists to perform military service, explaining that males under 27 who have not already completed their mandatory military service are no longer entitled to an extension.
Supporting this interpretation of events are Russia’s ongoing infiltration attempts along the entire border with the regions of Chernihiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv, aimed at creating a buffer zone. Although Moscow currently lacks the forces to implement such plans, it is likely that in the long term it intends to extend the buffer zone to the perimeter of Belarus as well.
The critical point, however, is that the map of Russian pressure is expanding and concerns not only the Northeast but a broader plan for peripheral destabilization.
Although no breakthrough attempt from the unrecognized region of Transnistria has been recorded, Alla Perdei and I have already documentedfrom the field the presence of spy balloons and FPV reconnaissance dronesidentical to those we see here in Ovruch. This phenomenon is frequent enough to prompt the local population of those border settlements to impose a stricter curfew than the current one. The ongoing Russian attacks on the Maiaky Bridge and the infiltration of saboteurs and raiders into Ukrainian Bessarabia also suggest that the Moscow regime’s objectives — as indicatedon a blackboard during a briefing by Lukashenko himself in the early stages of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine — remain the conquest of the regions of Odesa, Mykolaiv, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia. To create favorable conditions for the realization of such aggressive ambitions (which also included the fall of the Ukrainian capital), it is therefore clear that the Russians have included the creation of buffer zones in the Vinnytsia, Kyiv, and Zhytomyr regions in their plans.
The situation reported by the 14th Army Corps in the Myropillia area of Sumy Oblast’ remains complex, and incidents of kidnapping Ukrainian civilians have already spread to other inhabited settlements in the border areas, in addition to Hrabivske. These advances are limited to approximately 1–1.5 km from the state border, which the Ukrainian Armed Forces are managing to contain and slow, but which still allow the Russians to move to new positions.
It’s a mechanism consistent with the war we’ve been witnessing for years: the Kremlin doesn’t always seek a breakthrough where it threatens; very often, it seeks to saturate its adversary’s decision-making, preventing the adversary from simultaneously pursuing axes that are too far apart.
In this sense, Belarus can serve as a massive lever of indirect attrition for Moscow.
Even without launching a mass offensive, it’s enough to force Ukraine to commit forces to the north that could otherwise reinforce Donbas, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson. Minsk’s military value for Moscow remains enormous, even if only as a rear area, a pressure area, and a logistical and psychological platform that Ukraine lacks. Long-range Russian drones regularly arrive from there, using relays positioned within Belarusian borders (such as the four recently destroyed by the Kyiv Armed Forces) to support these attacks. This is a now consolidated pattern of Russia’s war in Ukraine, reaffirming the need to separate formal entry into war from actual military co-functionality.
It would be naive to interpret Presidential Decrees №67 of February 23 on spring conscription and №132 of April 17 on the recall of reserve officers, both signed by Lukashenko, as automatic proof of his country’s imminent declaration of war.
Formally, these texts are part of the standard conscription cycle of a country that already provides all kinds of assistance to the regime that unleashed the war in Ukraine. However, they constitute a political-military signal that complements a — more concrete — one, the construction of roads.
Evidence of a common strategic function evident in areas as distant from each other as those examined in this article. A multidirectional pressure that Ukraine will have to continue managing through an extensive and costly defense in terms of personnel and attention.
Within this interpretation, Sunday’s nighttime attack on Chernihiv (which killed a 16-year-old and injured others) is crucial because it prevents us from making a conceptual error: thinking that, since a large mechanized column ready to invade isn’t visible from the North today, that flank is secondary.
This isn’t the case.
The North may not be the main axis of the breakthrough, but it remains a vital axis of Russian terror. The point, then, isn’t simply whether Minsk will formally enter a war it has always supported, but rather recognizing that Moscow already derives a military dividend from the mere possibility of doing so.
Putin’s regime relies on the survival of another, which Moscow sees as an operational tool and an expendable pawn. Lukashenko is not an equal ally but a disposable asset that Moscow simply needs to keep afloat. Consequently, Belarus is not only a potential invasion line but also a Russian strategic asset already active against Ukraine.
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白俄羅斯未開一槍而發動的戰爭
作者：Giorgio Provinciali
翻譯：旺財球球
烏克蘭前線報道
奧夫魯奇 —— 從白俄羅斯邊境望去，可以看到新修的道路和炮位，無人機也頻繁出現。
尚未見到士兵，但這可能並非重點。
在評論烏克蘭武裝部隊總司令奧列克桑德爾·西爾斯基的最新報告時，澤連斯基總統確認，俄羅斯聯邦可能正試圖再次將白俄羅斯拖入戰爭。
根據公開情報，白俄羅斯工程兵正在修建通往烏克蘭的道路，並在邊境沿線架設炮位。
（圖：Alla與我在白俄羅斯邊境的烏克蘭一側 —— 版權所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
這可能是為了牽製烏克蘭軍隊、讓中央指揮將更多部隊調往北方，從而遠離俄羅斯武裝力量即便付出巨大人員代價仍然拒絕推進的關鍵戰線。然而，在奧夫魯奇及其他邊境城鎮的平民中，人們普遍認為重複2022年2月情景的風險是真實存在的，尤其是在白俄羅斯獨裁者亞曆山大·盧卡申科召集預備役服役、並宣布說27歲以下且尚未完成義務兵役的男性不再有延期服役權利之後，這種擔憂進一步加劇。
進一步印證這一判斷的是，俄羅斯沿切爾尼希夫、蘇米和哈爾科夫整個邊界地區持續發動滲透行動，企圖建立一個緩衝區。雖然莫斯科目前缺乏實施此類計劃的兵力，但長期來看很可能打算將緩衝區延展至白俄羅斯周邊。
關鍵在於，俄羅斯施壓的地圖正在擴大，所涉及的已不僅限於東北方向，而是更廣泛的外圍擾亂計劃。
（圖：大約兩個月前，Alla與我在奧夫魯奇報道 —— 版權所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
盡管尚未記錄到來自未被承認的德涅斯特河沿岸地區的突破性進攻，阿拉·佩爾代和我已在實地記錄到間諜氣球和FPV偵察無人機，與在奧夫魯奇所見完全相同。這一現象頻繁發生，促使邊境定居點的當地居民實施比現行更嚴格的宵禁。俄方對邁亞基橋的持續攻擊以及破壞分子和襲擊者滲入烏克蘭貝薩拉比亞的事件，也表明莫斯科政權的目標，正如盧卡申科本人在俄全麵入侵烏克蘭初期一次簡報中黑板上所示——仍是占領敖德薩、尼古拉耶夫、赫爾鬆和紮波羅熱等地區。為創造有利條件實現這些侵略性野心（當中也包括奪取烏克蘭首都），顯然俄方的計劃裏已包括在文尼察、基輔和日托米爾地區製造緩衝區。
（圖：白俄羅斯總統亞曆山大·盧卡申科在向其安全委員會發表講話時似乎展示了俄羅斯對摩爾多瓦的入侵計劃— 照片來源：“紐約郵報”）
第14軍團報告的蘇梅州米羅皮利亞地區的局勢仍然複雜，綁架烏克蘭平民的事件已從赫拉比夫斯克蔓延至其他邊境居民點。這些俄軍推進限於距國界大約1–1.5公裏範圍內，烏克蘭武裝部隊正在設法遏製並拖慢其進展，但仍不足以阻止俄軍占據新陣地。
（圖：Alla與我在被俄聯邦摧毀的赫爾鬆海軍學院報道 —— 版權所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
這一機製與我們多年來目睹的戰爭模式一致：克裏姆林宮並不總是在它威脅的地點視線突破；很多時候，它試圖通過飽和對手的決策空間，使其無法同時在過於分散的多個軸線上進行防禦或反擊。
在這一意義上，白俄羅斯可成為莫斯科實施間接消耗戰的巨大杠杆。
即便不發動大規模攻勢，僅靠迫使烏克蘭將兵力部署到北線，就足以使這些兵力無法增援頓巴斯、紮波羅熱和赫爾鬆。明斯克對莫斯科的軍事價值仍然巨大，即便隻是作為後方區域、施壓空間，以及烏克蘭所缺乏的後勤與心理平台。俄遠程無人機經常從那裏起飛，利用設在白俄羅斯境內的中繼站（例如被最近基輔武裝部隊摧毀的四處中繼）支持俄軍襲擊。這已成為俄羅斯對烏戰爭中的既定模式之一，進一步證明應把正式參戰與實際上的軍事協同區分開來。
（視頻：我在烏克蘭奧夫魯奇報道 —— 版權所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
將盧卡申科在2月23日簽署的第67號總統令（春季征兵）和4月17日簽署的第132號總統令（召回預備役軍官）簡單解讀為其國家即將正式宣戰的自動證據，是幼稚的。
在形式上，這些文件屬於一個早已全麵支持侵略烏克蘭政權的國家常規征兵周期。然而，它們構成了一個政治軍事信號，與另一個更為具體的信號相輔相成——即道路的修建。
這表明，如本篇文章所談及的那些地理位置相距甚遠的地區，其戰略功能依然高度一致。這是一種多向的壓力，烏克蘭將不得不通過耗費巨大和昂貴的人力與注意力的廣泛防禦繼續應對。
（圖：Alla與我在烏克蘭蘇梅州比洛皮利亞報道。俄軍也試圖在此滲透 —— 版權所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
在這種解讀框架下，周日對切爾尼希夫的夜間襲擊尤為關鍵。襲擊造成一名16歲少年死亡並多人受傷。襲擊的意義在於阻止我們犯一個概念性錯誤：認為既然北方目前看不到一支準備入侵的大型機械化縱隊，那麽該側翼就是次要的。
事實並非如此。
北線或許不是突破的主軸，但仍然是俄方恐怖行動的關鍵軸線。因此，問題不在於明斯克是否會正式加入它一貫支持的戰爭，而在於認識到，莫斯科已從僅僅存在這種可能性中獲得了軍事收益。
普京政權依賴另一個政權的存續，莫斯科將該政權視為一種可被利用的工具和可犧牲的棋子。盧卡申科並非平等的盟友，而是一個保持其勉強存續的可棄棋子。
因此，白俄羅斯不僅是潛在的入侵通道，還是一個已對烏克蘭發生作用的俄羅斯戰略資產。
（圖：我在烏克蘭奧夫魯奇郊外拍的一張照片，位於靠近白俄羅斯邊境 —— 版權所有，Giorgio Provinciali）
***
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