世界大戰是如何打起來的？

曆史上有些衝突非得武力解決不可，如始皇帝要統一天下，不過一旦訴諸武力，難免生靈塗炭，所以孫子說不戰為上策。

 

不過曆史上不必要動武卻動了武的事件就更多了，現在回想起來，以前古時大家說打就打，是愚昧，腦子沒開竅，不見棺材不掉淚。可是腦子開竅了並不意味著做事就理智了，精英權貴們殺起人來眼睛不不眨，最典範的例子，莫過於一戰（第一次世界大戰）。

 

【當然，時代進步了並不意味著大家更理智了，人類的同情心就增加了。不久前，西方大肆聲討“共產主義國家”以“人民”的名義造成大規模的死亡（這點中蘇和其他小兄弟解釋不清），可是另一方麵，二戰後世界上多少真正的動刀動槍的戰爭是美國引起的，造成的毀壞是多少？現在整個中東不就是美國摧毀的嗎？也難免有人攻擊美國搬起石頭砸自己的腳，直接引發極端伊斯蘭組織。】

 

一戰，是白人“文明“間的較量，大家都是基督徒，殺起來好像心裏想的都是基督，開戰後全歐洲愛國情緒高漲，然而一戰卻是最莫名其妙，最愚蠢的人類自相殘殺。

 

當時歐洲工業革命已結成碩果，生活水平，社會環境，科學藝術技術創新和大規模工業生產，已經達到一個世紀前不可想象的水平，而且全世界通訊也非常發達，貿易遍布全球，歐洲工業也密切相關，互相依賴，雖然各國之間的競爭很激烈，尤其是殖民地和世界市場的爭執（大家如果在中國接受教育，大概給熟悉“帝國主義、殖民主義曆史”），比如英國海軍和德國海軍的軍備競賽，很危險，不過所有人都覺得不會打，不可能打，也不願打，反應到當時的社會是一片享樂的氣氛。

 

可是一戰還是打起來了，兩千萬人死，兩千萬人傷，毀壞就更大了，連遠離歐洲的中國也陷在裏麵，因為新的勢力要搶舊的勢力，中國隻是個戰利品。打的原因，就是各國彼此間的統治階層盲目地宣揚仇視他國、好戰的情緒，言語越來越激烈，到了被自己逼到毫無退路的環境，結果一個“意外”（意外事件其實是必然發生的事件）但悲劇式的事件就引發了文明世界相互殘殺的恐怖劇。

 

用今天通俗的話來說，就是大家高呼口號，互相不讓步，不給對方麵子，不給對方台階下，話都說死了，結果來個意外，大家除了動槍別無選擇，因為那是你自己的“麵子”已經無法放得下（所謂“麵子”，西方稱之為“尊嚴”，dignity，“麵子”是西方貶低中國的詞——雖然他們也用於自己——就是自己執政的合法性），這主觀選擇對立的策略，盡管完全可以避免，最後也隻能將大家帶上戰場。

 

美國對中國製裁是出於中國在“西方製度、體製”內用種種手腕利用“非法占利”的回應，然而關稅不僅是下策，在規矩的範圍內還是最不公平的懲罰，不過這是美國總統的智力唯一能想到的。中國嘴上說要改善，但遲遲沒有行動，現在一旦被攻擊，覺得隻能反擊（否則習近平“人民領袖”的形象如何下台？）；淳樸（Donald Trump，人稱特朗普或川普）恰如一個中學霸王，隻能阿諛逢迎，哪能衝撞？結果加碼，你不是要打嗎？打。

 

習近平咋辦？隻能跟上。商業部已經表態了，“奉陪到底”，雙方的交涉也終止了，整個陷入僵局。

 

在白宮，美國政府已經沒有任何製衡的力量。所有所謂“理智”的人物都已經被趕走了，剩下的要麽是跟淳樸想的一樣的，要麽是不敢說話的，要麽是跟屁蟲。

 

在中南海，中國政府同樣已經沒有任何製衡的力量，別說國務院人大，即使政治局常委，也已經是形式的。李克強現在難道不是像俄國總理梅德韋傑夫似的，隻是給大家照相的？

如果說淳樸是給自己中學霸王的意識支配著，那習近平就是給自己的救世主思維主宰著。兩者似乎天壤之別，效應卻未必有差別，那就是兩個霸主，不論理智或非理智，為了“得勝”，為了“本國利益”，把世界機器引向災難性結局。

 

這場災難性的“遊戲”有個大家忽略的危險因素，就是全世界（中國美國歐洲日本等等）都認真研究習近平的一言一行，覺得他說啥是啥，然而沒人把淳樸說的話當真，覺得他是是咋呼，是初等“交易”（談判）伎倆。不過，當兩頭公牛較上勁後，當真也好，不當真也好，不見血難有什麽結局。

 

President Trump created confusion within his administration and abroad because of a negotiating style you could call "governing by bluffing":（Axios）

He threatened to veto a spending bill that conservatives hate, then signed it.

He announced stiff tariffs on imports of steel and aluminum, then the administration started negotiating tons of carve-outs.

He talks of war with North Korea, then agrees to meet with Kim Jong-un.

He muses openly of replacing top aides, including White House Chief of Staff John Kelly, then lets them stay.

 

大家都覺得淳樸其實會降價的。真的嗎？

 

曆史都一樣，民眾覺得這世界太不公平了，覺得霸王能改變現狀，還給自己應有的權益，而幾個霸王自覺代表全民，一舉一動都是必要的措施，結果一步一步走向不可逆轉的災難。

 

蠢。

 

 

《金融時報專欄》狼馬（Martin Wolf）

 

2018.04.08
The Chinese economy is rebalancing, at last

We are seeing a necessary change towards more reliance on consumer demand

 

Consumption is at last becoming the most important driver of demand in the Chinese economy. This is a long-awaited and desirable adjustment. It promises to shift China away from its excessive reliance on inefficient, debt-fuelled investment. But it still has a long way to go. As the shift is being completed, the country will need to manage an overhang of bad debt. But the adjustment has begun.

 

In 2007, premier Wen Jiabao argued rightly that “the biggest problem with China’s economy is that the growth is unstable, unbalanced, uncoordinated and unsustainable”. In that year, gross national savings were 50 per cent of gross domestic product, up from 37 per cent in 2000. These huge savings financed domestic investment of 41 per cent of GDP and a current account surplus of 9 per cent.

 

 

Then came the global financial crisis. The Chinese authorities promptly realised that the current account surplus had become unsustainable. In the short run, the only way to avoid a slump was to expand investment further. In 2011, gross investment reached 48 per cent of GDP and the current account surplus fell to 2 per cent. But national savings remained at 50 per cent of GDP. (See charts.)

 

This solution brought new problems. The first was a declining return on investment. The simplest way of showing this is via the incremental capital-output ratio (ICOR), which measures the amount of investment needed to generate a given increase in output. This has roughly doubled since 2007. That is not surprising: the investment rate has jumped, while growth has nearly halved. Moreover, the rise in the ICOR may well understate the true decline in returns: as Michael Pettis of Peking University’s Guanghua School of Management argues, useless investment does not contribute to GDP.

 

 

The second problem is that the increased investment was driven by a huge rise in debt. According to the Institute of International Finance, gross debt rose from 171 to 295 per cent of GDP between the fourth quarter of 2008 and the third quarter of 2017. This is very high for an emerging country. Moreover, half of the increased debt went to non-financial corporate entities, which did much of the increased investment. A substantial portion of this increased debt may prove to be bad. Starting from the dramatic rise in the credit-dependence of growth, London-based Enodo Economics argues that the needed debt write-offs might ultimately amount to 20 per cent of GDP. This might seem big. But it would be manageable for a creditor country with a largely closed financial system.

 

 

Up to 2014, then, nothing had happened to make the Chinese economy seem any less unstable, unbalanced, uncoordinated and unsustainable. On the contrary, China had merely replaced an excessive current account surplus, with still more excessive investment, soaring debt and property bubbles. The past three years have witnessed change at last: investment has fallen by 3 per cent of GDP, while public and private consumption have risen by much the same proportion. As a result, consumption has become a more important source of additional demand than investment. Thus, in 2017, notes a background paper to this year’s China Development Forum, final consumption contributed 59 per cent of GDP growth. As investment growth has declined at long last, the rise in indebtedness has also (apparently) stopped.

 

 

Behind this has been a willingness to substitute quality for quantity of growth. Explanations for this willingness include the shrinkage of the labour force and a slowing of the rate of rural-urban migration. The increasingly service-driven economy of today is also more employment-intensive than the heavy-industry driven economy of the past. With the labour force now shrinking and growth more employment intensive, real wages have soared, raising the share of labour in national income. Enodo Economics argues that in 2015 the share of household disposable income and labour compensation were already higher than in Japan and South Korea.

 

It is only because the household savings rate is still very high in China that private consumption is so low a share of GDP. As ageing takes hold, that is likely to change, possibly quite quickly. If the government were to provide an adequate safety net and better health and education services, as well, the household savings rate might fall sharply. If so, the investment rate could also shrink to a more appropriate level. After all, it is still substantially higher than it was in 2007, let alone 2000.

 

 

In brief, while the shifts are slow and the full adjustment to more reasonable levels could take until the middle of the next decade, we are seeing early signs of the necessary change in the structure of the Chinese economy towards one that is less unbalanced and, above all, one that is more reliant on the consumer demand of China’s vast population. That would, in turn, be good for China and for the rest of the world.

 

Good policy could also accelerate the shift, by increasing the transfer of profits to the people, via ownership, taxation or, better still, a bit of both. It is more or less inevitable that a clean up of excessive debt will also be needed, together with substantial reform of the financial sector. But that would also become far easier if the huge imbalances — above all, the excessive reliance on investment — were at an end.

 

The chances of achieving desperately needed rebalancing and even of managing that transformation fairly smoothly are rising. The story told by former premier Wen is far from over. But we can now at least envisage a happy ending.

 

 

 

2018.03.27
How China can avoid a trade war with the US

Beijing must recognise the shift in American perceptions and make some concessions

 

How should China respond to Donald Trump’s aggressive trade policy? The answer is: strategically. It needs to manage a rising tide of US hostility.

 

Of the events in Washington last week, the appointment of John Bolton as the US president’s principal adviser on national security may well be more momentous than the announcement of a “section 301” trade action against China. Nevertheless, the plan to impose 25 per cent tariffs on $60bn of (as yet, unspecified) Chinese exports to the US shows the aggression of Mr Trump’s trade agenda. The proposed tariffs are just one of several actions aimed at China’s technology-related policies. These include a case against China at the World Trade Organization and a plan to impose new restrictions on its investments in US technology companies.

 

 

The objectives of these US actions are unclear. Is it merely to halt alleged misbehaviour, such as forced transfers — or outright theft — of intellectual property? Or, as the labelling of China as a “strategic competitor” suggests, is it to halt China’s technological progress altogether — an aim that is unachievable and certainly non-negotiable.

 

Mr Trump also emphasised the need for China to slash its US bilateral trade surplus by $100bn. Indeed, his rhetoric implies that trade should balance with each partner. This aim is, once again, neither achievable nor negotiable.

 

 

The optimistic view is that these are opening moves in a negotiation that will end in a deal. A more pessimistic perspective is that this is a stage in an endless process of fraught negotiations between the two superpowers far into the future. A still more pessimistic view is that trade discussions will break down in a cycle of retaliation, perhaps as part of broader hostilities.

 

Which it turns out to be also depends on China. It must recognise the shift in US perceptions, of which Mr Trump’s election is a symptom. Moreover, on trade, the Democrats are far more protectionist than the Republicans. What are the forces driving this shift? China’s rise has made the US fear the loss of its primacy. China’s communist autocracy is ideologically at odds with US democracy. What economists call “the China shock” has been real and significant, although trade with China has not been the main reason for the adverse changes experienced by US industrial workers. The US has also failed to provide the safety net or active support needed by affected workers and communities.

 

 

Furthermore, the deal reached when China joined the WTO in 2001 is no longer acceptable. As Mr Trump states, the US wants strict “reciprocity”. Finally, many business people argue that China is “cheating”, in pursuit of its industrial objectives.

 

Experience shows that the complaints will never end. A decade or so ago, complaints were about China’s current account surpluses, undervalued exchange rate and huge accumulations of reserves. All these have now been transformed: the current account surplus itself has fallen to just 1.4 per cent of gross domestic product. Now complaints have shifted towards bilateral imbalances, forced transfers of technology, excess capacity and China’s foreign direct investment. China is successful, big and different. Complaints change, but not the complaining.

 

 

How might China manage these frictions, exacerbated by the character of Mr Trump, yet rooted in deep anxieties?

 

First, retaliate with targeted, precise and limited countermeasures. Like all bullies, Mr Trump respects strength. Indeed, he respects China’s Xi Jinping.

 

Second, defuse legitimate complaints or ones whose redress is in China’s interests. Liberalising the Chinese economy is in China’s own interests, as the astonishing results of 40 years of “reform and opening up” demonstrate. China can and should accelerate its own domestic and external liberalisation. Among the widely shared complaints of foreign businesses, is over pressure to transfer know-how as part of doing business in China. Such “performance requirements” are contrary to WTO rules. China needs to act decisively on this.

 

Third, make some concessions. China could import liquefied natural gas from the US. This would reduce the bilateral surplus, while merely reallocating gas supplies across the world. But doing the same thing for commodities in which China is the world’s dominant market would be far more problematic, since it would hurt other suppliers. Mr Trump may well want China to discriminate against Australian foodstuffs or European aircraft. That way lies the end of the liberal global trading system.

 

 

Fourth, multilateralise these discussions. The issue of surpluses in standard products like steel cannot be dealt with at a purely unilateral or bilateral level. As a rising global power, China could play a central role in trade liberalisation, thereby strengthening the system and increasing the world’s stake in the health of the Chinese economy. Operating at such a global level brings another potential benefit: it is hard for great powers to negotiate bilaterally, since they tend to view concessions to each other as humiliating.

 

In the global context, however, a concession can be seen as a benefit to everybody. Finally, by operating under the rubric of the WTO, China puts Europeans in a difficult position. Europeans share US anxieties over China’s policies on intellectual property, but they also believe in the rules. If China took the high road, Europeans might feel compelled to support it.

 

We are in a new era of strategic competition. The question is whether this will be managed or lead to a breakdown in relations. Mr Trump’s trade policy is a highly destabilising part of this story. China should take the longer view of it, for its own sake and that of the world.