2013年06月13日
社論
2013年6月13日
金融市場這兩個月來劇烈震蕩，投資者的情緒也七上八下。黃金價格連續上漲多年後，在4月中突然暴跌，從2011年9月每安士1920美元的曆史高點 猛降至1321美元，黃金進入了熊市。同樣的，東京股市在日本首相安倍晉三上台以來，也曾大幅度上漲，但日經指數最近卻節節敗退，從5月23日的高峰期下 跌了兩成，符合了熊市的定義。除此之外，高股息的股票，特別是房地產信托基金，一度是投資者追逐收益時的首選，最近遭到巨大的賣壓。
黃金、日本股票及高息股票的暴跌，部分原因是從高位調整及賣空者平倉，畢竟在寬鬆貨幣政策的環境下，這些投資工具的漲勢淩厲，即使在這一輪的盤整 後，其價格還是比金融危機前夕高。這些投資在此之前暴漲，主要歸功於多國中央銀行在金融危機後推出的貨幣量化寬鬆政策。全球主要央行推出非常規的量寬政 策，試圖通過通脹以刺激疲軟的經濟，導致資產價格飛漲。從主要工業國緩慢的經濟複蘇步伐顯示，量寬政策投放的巨額流動資金，沒有如預期般的流入實體經濟， 而是卡在金融及投資市場。資金泛濫令投資者擔心貨幣購買力的減弱，也驅使他們四處追逐收益，並投入樓市及股市等的高風險資產。發達國家的量寬政策外溢，導 致新興市場麵對熱錢湧入及房地產泡沫的挑戰。因此，量寬政策的終結及熱錢回流，將可能重挫新興市場。
美國聯儲局自2008年11月以來，推出三輪量寬政策，其資產負債表從2008年初的9222億美元劇增至目前的3.4萬億美元。美國輿論及財經界 開始擔心，這個非常規的貨幣政策若持續過久，將使資產泡沫不斷膨脹，並扭曲資金的成本，使價格趨向不穩定。此外，量寬政策是變相的貨幣貶值，可能引發貨幣 戰及貿易保護主義，使市場對貨幣失去信心。美國聯儲局在最近幾次的政策會議上，也開始提出退市的課題。聯儲局主席伯南克去年底指出，隻有在美國失業率降至 6.5％以下及通脹率上升到2％以上，才會考慮停止量寬政策。但他最近則表示，聯儲局將根據經濟情況增減量寬的規模。雖然他對退市問題不置可否，但市場寧 可相信，量寬政策的規模即將縮小，最終完全退出。從黃金、日本股票及高息股票的暴跌以及區域貨幣走軟顯示，敏感的市場在美國量寬政策終結前，已作出反應。 最近，美國10年期國債息率上升及美元走強，反映市場對聯儲局退市的預期。此外，美元上升也吸引了資金回流。
由於美國的量寬政策持續了近五年，聯儲局的資產負債表膨脹了不少，它要如何既有序地退市而又不會導致金融市場的震蕩，將考驗伯南克的智慧及他對時間 點的掌握。市場及炒家對退市的時間表，做出多種揣測。有分析員根據伯南克去年底提出的失業率及通脹率兩個指標，推論量寬政策還會持續一段時間，因為美國最 近公布的失業率還是高達7.6％。但美國聯儲局前主席格林斯潘近日表示，不論美國經濟是否已複蘇，量寬政策應該盡快結束，“因為市場不會給我們太多的時 間”。世界銀行前行長及美國前副國務卿佐立克前天在新加坡舉行的一個論壇上也警告，中央銀行推出的量寬政策，壓低了利率，導致資產價格與經濟基本麵脫鉤。 然而，格林斯潘和佐立克異口同聲警告，倉促退市將使市場出現巨大震蕩。
除了美國外，歐元區國家及日本也有量寬政策的計劃。但歐元區是由17個國家組成，富裕國家不願買單，因此歐洲央行購買債券的計劃還未能落實。德國一 些民眾指這個計劃違反憲法，交由法庭裁決。日本在安倍首相領導下推行的量寬政策，也尚未取得預期的效果。日本國債利率及日元匯率最近不下反上，反映市場的 謹慎態度。另一方麵，雖然中國經濟增長放緩，但中國國務院總理李克強表示，要通過激活貨幣信貸存量支持實體經濟發展，這顯示擴張性的貨幣政策空間不大。
在量寬政策的縮減及終結下，市場將為急劇膨脹的資產，重新定價。當利率回升到金融危機前的正常水平及熱錢回流時，新興經濟體在這幾年來資金泛濫下的信貸擴張，將麵臨償債能力的考驗。投資者在投入風險資產時，應先計算自己的持守能力。
A bubble that's primed to explode, not just pop
US tightening, Japan easing, Europe deleveraging - it's a nerve-racking balancing process
Lack of coordination? Maintaining the lake of global liquidity created by quantitative easing seems to be regarded by markets as the shared obligation of the Federal Reserve (above) and other leading individual central banks, even though these august institutions themselves apparently feel no such obligation. - PHOTO: AFP
I AM getting nervous - very nervous, in fact. In my career as a journalist, I have seen many financial bubbles develop and burst but never anything like the present QE-induced global bubble. I doubt whether there ever has been such a phenomenon before, in absolute or GDP-relative terms.
I'm referring, of course, to the massive quantitative easing (QE) packages that have proliferated in number and size at the hands of the US Federal Reserve, the Bank of England, the European Central Bank and the Bank of Japan (BOJ) principally.
Each and all of these banks has blown its own bubbles in the past: in the UK in the 1970s, in Japan in the 1980s, in the US in the late 1990s, and then again in 2008, and in Europe too.
But they are all blowing together this time and the bubble could explode rather than simply pop.
Synchronised
What is most worrying perhaps is that while central banks have no "synchronised" strategy for exiting from these monumental monetary easing exercises (any more than they synchronised their entry), financial markets are becoming highly synchronised in their reaction to a prospective exit.
Not only that but maintaining the lake of global liquidity created by QE seems to be regarded by markets as the shared obligation of leading individual central banks, even though these august institutions themselves apparently feel no such obligation
An illustration came this week when the Bank of Japan, judging that Japanese Government Bonds (JGB) had begun to stabilise after their recent extreme volatility, decided not to make the further moves that markets had looked for to ward off possible further yield spikes.
Equity markets from London to Asia went into a spin (yet another one) and analysts blamed the BOJ for not doing anything new to add to the pool of global liquidity by buying yet more bonds. Thus we have a globalised market expectation of what is not a globalised commitment by the central banks.
The Fed, through its chairman Ben Bernanke, has suggested that it might start tightening (buying fewer Treasury bonds) earlier than many had expected, and we seem to have an expectation on the part of financial markets that other central banks will make easing gestures to compensate.
What happens, I asked someone familiar with BOJ thinking, if the Fed becomes serious about its tightening intentions? What impact might that have on BOJ policy, and on the flows of liquidity into and out of Japan and other economies outside of the US?
The response was instructive and, in my view at least, far from reassuring. The idea of synchronised tightening by the Fed, the BOJ or other leading central banks "does not make sense", the person suggested.
Similar views were expressed by BOJ governor Haruhiko Kuroda after the BOJ Policy Board met on Tuesday.
The Fed, he said, is well into its QE programme whereas Japan is only now getting started in earnest. The implication was that each must go its own way.
This disavowal of synchronised action misses the point that even if central banks see no need to move in coordinated fashion, bond, equity and currency markets seem to expect that this is precisely what the central banks should do if damage is not to result from uncoordinated moves.
Equally, or perhaps more worrying, is that central banks do not appear to have any real idea of what will happen once one or more of their number decides that it's time to exit from QE and starts to tighten the screws on easy money.
A common assumption is that once the Fed does begin to put up the shutters on QE, US interest rates will "normalise" (rise) and money will flow back to the US from Asian and other emerging markets where it has contributed to a surge in asset prices.
Not necessarily so, argue BOJ insiders. There could be "turmoil" in US financial markets as a result of a change in Fed policy and that could cause money actually to flow out of the US and into other markets. This may be true - but it's hardly something we should be reassured about.
It would be nice to think that the Ben Bernankes, Haruhiko Kurodas, Mario Draghis and Mervyn Kings of this world (respective central bank governors in the US, Japan, Europe and Britain) talked intensively and often about the need to coordinate their actions.
But recent experience - plus the fact that even the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in Basel, which is supposed to be the "central bankers' bank", felt bound to issue a caution recently about unbridled QE excesses - suggests that central bankers are intent on doing their own thing.
Central banks are prone to suffering from "blind spots" from time to time. For a long time, this myopia was related to domestic asset inflation or massive run-ups in the level of stock and property markets at home. But since the birth of QE, it has taken on an international or global dimension.
This is obvious from global capital flows. As the World Bank notes in its latest Global Economic Prospects report, "during the first five months of 2013, gross capital flows (international bond issuance, cross-border syndicated bank loans and equity placements) to developing countries rose 63 per cent, reaching a historic high at US$306 billion".
Volatile
How volatile these flows will prove is not certain. "The uniformly accommodative stance of monetary policy in high-income countries may become more diverse as the US reduces the extent of quantitative easing and Japan expands it," says the World Bank.
A gradual transition towards tightening in the US is likely to increase the cost of capital for developing countries, and expectations of such a move may lead to an easing in flows even earlier.
All of this may yet unwind smoothly if - and it is a big if - Japan's easing smoothly takes up the slack left by a tightening US and if deleveraging by European banks slows in a controlled manner.
But continuing violent swings in equity, bond and currency markets do not suggest that financial markets have confidence in the ability of central banks to manage the transition.
