“Dialogue is now conditional on us not criticizing China,” a senior German official told me. “We can’t even have a rational conversation about the sanctions.”
To be a true threat to the United States, China must combine a desire to harm the United States or its interests with the ability to do so. Unfortunately, Beijing increasingly has demonstrated both.
In this year’s Annual Worldwide Threat Assessment, the U.S. intelligence community is explicit on this point, calling China increasingly a “near-peer competitor” that has “demonstrated the capability and intent to advance their interests at the expense of the United States and its allies.”
One such warning: China will replace America. China is on track to surpass us economically, militarily and geopolitically.
it employs effective economic principles, technology and education. China has replaced socialism with capitalism, stolen technology and educated large cohorts of its people — by 2016, it boasted eight times as many STEM graduates a year as the United States
We must constrain China’s economic predation by partnering with our allies and friends to deny China free access to our markets unless it agrees to abide by global rules of fair trade
"Europe sees itself as a moderating force in the escalating competition between the United States and China. For economic and political reasons, it is pushing back against the notion of a zero-sum world and refusing to choose sides. Walking this geopolitical tightrope will be increasingly challenging. China may welcome a nonaligned Europe, but U.S. politicians will find it very difficult to swallow." -- Noah Barkin
Biden touts his Buy American plans: "Every single thing, from the deck of an aircraft carrier to the railing of a new building, is going to be built by an American company, American workers, American supply chain, so that we invest American tax dollars in American workers." pic.twitter.com/1p6nISNHz3
by stipulating that “the United States Government shall not place any restrictions on the ability of officials of the Department of State and other United States Government departments and agencies to interact directly and routinely with counterparts in the Taiwan government.”
“If China sent special operations forces or used lethal drone strikes in a half-dozen African or Asian countries to combat potential anti-Chinese terrorism, Washington would lose its mind. That’s American exceptionalism.”
Biden's bombshell proposal on vaccines is just the latest case in point:
On everything from trade to taxes, he is as much of a pain in Brussels' bureaucratic backside as his predecessor — hitting where it hurts, while robbing it of the moral high ground.https://t.co/fWEXpPyxsf
As a result, the U.S. government laid claim not only to vast quantities of finished COVID-19 vaccines but also to vaccine components and equipment all along the supply chain, according to a Reuters review of more than a dozen contracts involving some major suppliers.
But the waiver would not address a less conspicuous but equally pressing problem: the growing worldwide shortage of vaccine ingredients and manufacturing equipment. The United States has a tight grip on a significant amount of those materials, such as filters, tubing and specialized disposable bags essential to making vaccines.
美國說美國不是禁運,就是產量不夠,但美國優先
Katherine Tai, the U.S. trade representative, briefly mentioned in her statement about Biden’s patent decision that the administration would “work to increase the raw materials needed” to make vaccines. She did not elaborate
A dose of the BioNTech/Pfizer vaccine, for example, requires 280 components from multiple countries, according to the company. The idea of moving from what Okonjo-Iweala calls “just in time to just in case to just at home” is harder than it looks.
It has become apparent that American business and industry have shifted decisively away from Chinese sourcing, in part because of China’s nationalist positioning during the pandemic but also because of more lasting and fundamental cost considerations
But partners from Japan to Australia are nervous about one thing: the lack of a strong trade and economic component to his Asia strategy.
“The presence of an aircraft carrier or destroyer is not going to demonstrate the type of value that many American allies and partners most seek.”
美國幾年之內不會有任何行動,原因是什麽?
“We need to revisit why agreements like the TPP became so fragile here, reformulate our policies . . . continue to engage our partners, but along the lines of reformed policies so that these very important commitments that we take with our partners don’t fall apart and are more durable and sustainable going forward,” Tai added
2016: HRC won the popular vote by 3M votes but lost the election because of <80K votes across three States (WI, MI, PA). Under-reported fact: In 2020 Biden won the popular vote by >6M votes but a swing of fewer than 45K votes across WI, AZ, and GA would have had Trump re-elected.
if the current Republican Party controls both Houses of Congress on Jan. 6, 2025, there’s no way if a Democrat is legitimately elected they will get certified as the president-elect.”
Nearly 70 percent of the value of a typical solar panel assembled in the United States accrues to firms in China or Chinese firms operating across Southeast Asia
Many managers are unwilling to raise wages and prices enough to keep up, as they worry that demand will ebb in a few months and leave them with permanently higher payroll costs
“So far we are trying to counter Belt and Road mostly with buzzwords and lofty policy papers,” said one senior EU diplomat. “But unfortunately there is no real geopolitical strategy or plan which is consistent and coherent. There’s a real need to work together on infrastructure projects and avoid countries becoming over-reliant on China.”
中國的一帶一路,按英國智庫漆鹹樓(Chatham House,正式名稱為皇家國際事務研究所,The Royal Institute of International Affairs)綜合西方的解釋, 是中國的一個地緣政治戰略,其目的是在歐亞大陸甚至整個世界建立以中國為中心的新秩序,包含了 “深思熟慮的中國大戰略”,旨在“重新奪回亞洲的地緣政治主導權,挑戰]美國的主導權,建立以中國為中心的秩序”,是一個“地緣政治和外交攻勢”,其目的“無異於改寫當前的地緣政治格局,建立世界主導權”,這些觀點也成為美國政府的看法,將之視為。漆鹹樓很權威
As the BRI has developed over the years, projects have been largely scaled back, and the ones we’ve seen in the last few years tend to be more in touch with local conditions.
The PRC has learned these lessons, and is getting better at this kind of work. The BRI isn’t going anywhere (it’s Xi’s signature FP and is in the CCP constitution) and the liberal world would do well not to write it off due to a few early failures
These include confidentiality clauses that prevent borrowers from revealing the terms of the loans, informal collateral arrangements that benefit Chinese lenders over other creditors and promises to keep the debt out of collective restructurings - dubbed by the authors as “no Paris Club” clauses, the report said. The contracts also give substantial leeway for China to cancel loans or accelerate repayment, it added.
Maria Adele Carrai is an assistant professor in global China studies at New York University Shanghai
肯尼亞鐵路,To critics, Kenya’s railway project represents another example of Chinese-owed debt and China’s growing influence in Africa. Indeed, many commentators point out that Kenya has an estimated $9 billion in China-financed debt — and note their concerns that a growing number of projects under China’s Belt and Road Initiative,
My research on two Chinese railway megaprojects in East Africa — the Nairobi-Mombasa line and Ethiopia’s Addis Ababa-Djibouti project — suggests the fears that China is upending development guidelines might be misplaced
I analyzed primary sources like Chinese government corporate social responsibility
Chinese government and state-owned enterprises have made CSR a priority, yet these two railway megaprojects show that implementation largely depends on local conditions, suggests insufficient Chinese government enforcement of CSR policies encourages Chinese organizations and enterprises to follow host-government guidelines. At times, this means Chinese companies resort to what I call “adaptive governance” 主要的問題是中企【如果發現東道主國的法律要求低過中國政府的,就】采用東道主國的,這是
Beijing has actively worked to increase CSR within Chinese state-owned enterprises and banks since the early 2000s. The central government, ever cognizant of its international reputation, has vigorously promoted higher standards for state-owned and private Chinese enterprises operating abroad. Hundreds of Chinese regulations and codes require Chinese companies to respect local customs and cultures, honor social responsibilities and protect labor and the environment. In both Kenya and Ethiopia, however, the impact of China’s national directives appears to be limited. Here’s what I found
Brussels responds to Podgorica’s request — and whether it will bail the country out of a project long deemed unviable — will help to shape the bloc’s relationship with the region.
“This is the first time that Montenegro or any other country from the western Balkans has made this type of outreach towards Brussels to combat rising Chinese influence."
Montenegro raised eyebrows in 2014 when it signed a deal with China’s ExIm Bank to finance 85 per cent of the cost of a road with a dollar-denominated loan worth almost $1bn. The first 41km section, a quarter of the total length, cost €20m per km, making it one of the most expensive highways per km in the world, said Spajic.
黑山共和國受惑,中國國企推銷,結果背上巨債,現在成了國際事件
Its decision has been scrutinised given that two separate feasibility studies, in 2006 and 2012, concluded that the highway was economically unviable. The government also signed a €54m contract with a Montenegrin-Chinese consortium for a thermal power plant just before it was ejected from office.
signed by the previous Montenegro government led by the Democratic Party of Socialists, which was ousted in August after 30 years in power.
胡說:
Observers said Montenegro’s plea was an opportunity for Brussels. “The EU should step in,” said Tena Prelec, a scholar at the University of Oxford who studies the region. “Montenegro is in the EU’s backyard: it would be, finally, a concrete way to show that the EU is indeed a player, a true geostrategic actor.”
Bruno Maçães, Dec 27, 2020
And this for me was the piece that least contributed to the debate, sending us back a few years in our understanding of what the Belt and Road is
Based on the observation of its implementation, Beijing’s official statements, and my own research, I would argue it is a constantly changing group of policy settings, which encompasses almost all the various clarifications
In practice, the piecemeal realization of BRI projects is determined by local governments and their related political and economic interests via diverse and time-consuming bilateral interaction with Beijing
Yufan Huang is a PhD candidate in the government department of Cornell University
Chinese banks offered African countries significant debt restructuring before the pandemic and have continued to do so
中國主動與債務國協商遠超出西方報道
The G-20 effort marks the first time China is participating in multilateral debt relief. As Africa’s largest bilateral creditor, China holds at least 21 percent of African debt — and payments to China account for nearly 30 percent of 2021’s debt service, as shown in the figure below.
西方: they are not relaxing repayment requirements. Likewise, bondholders, who are responsible for 19 percent of 2021’s debt service, have held back from providing any debt relief.
Our research at the Johns Hopkins SAIS China-Africa Research Initiative (CARI) suggests that China has played a significant role in helping African countries to manage their debt. We documented 16 cases of debt restructuring worth $7.5 billion in 10 African countries between 2000 and 2019
Our research found that Chinese lenders have not pursued lawsuits in cases of debt default. We also found no asset seizures.
Chinese President Xi Jinping’s signature foreign policy undertaking and the world’s largest infrastructure program, poses a significant challenge to U.S. economic, political, climate change, security, and global health interests
China has not been the primary driver behind rising debt risks in the Pacific, although a continuation of business as usual would risk future debt problems in several countries.
There is scope for a new Australian infrastructure financing facility to provide loans to the Pacific without causing debt problems, particularly as it has adopted key sustainable lending rules.
Pacific nations have an opportunity to obtain more favourable financing from official development partners but care must be taken to avoid overly geopolitical aid.
This whole narrative misunderstands China and ignores the interests and agency of recipient countries
Sinologists have documented the reality of what they term fragmented authoritarianism, recounting fierce inter-agency rivalries and factionalism, which top leaders struggle to manage, even under Xi,
In reality, the idea of aggregating China’s long-standing infrastructure connectivity projects beneath a broad banner originated with the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC),
as party-state agencies jostled for resources.
Disbursements start with requests from abroad, not Chinese planners. The whole edifice—especially today, with growth slowing, profitability collapsing, and surplus capacity endemic—is skewed towards helping Chinese businesses expand overseas
have run headlong into China’s paramount priority of defending its authoritarian system from foreign interference.
好像不加上“authoritarian”一字中國就無條件接受了似的
It has launched the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the New Development Bank (along with Brazil, Russia, India, and South Africa), and, most notably, the Belt and Road Initiative, Xi’s grandiose vision for building land and maritime routes to connect China to much of the world. These institutions and programs have given China agenda-setting and convening power of its own, while often departing from the standards and values upheld by existing international institutions.
he had no direct communications links with his Chinese counterpart. Somewhat reassuringly, China and the U.S. have some agreed-on protocols for unplanned encounters at sea and in the air.
China has also developed gray zone tactics in the South China Sea -- blurring civilian and military capabilities -- with a mandate to use force if necessary to support China's territorial claims.
隻是強調兩國關係惡化,沒有接觸,沒有有效的
“Xi Jinping was chosen to deal with the centripetal forces of Hu Jintao’s decade: indecision, stalled reforms, ministers ignoring the prime minister, local governments ignoring the center, the private economy overrunning the state economy, civil society threatening the role of the Party, and military leaders focused on real estate deals.”